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Undoing Our Selves: The Error of Sacrificing
Speech in the Quest for Equality
JOHN M. BLIM*
[M]y language is the sum total of myself....
Charles S. Peircel
If there be minority groups who hail this holding as their victory, they might
consider the possible relevancy of this ancient remark:
"Another such victory and I am undone."
Justice Hugo Black2
I. INTRODUCTION
Ronald Dworkin and Richard Posner, in their separate though virtually
simultaneous reviews of Catharine MacKinnon's recent book, Only Words,3
each expressed both serious doubt and some surprise over one of the book's
central arguments, the idea that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment demands the suppression of any speech that endangers the goal of
social equality. 4 Thus, readers of the popular press during one week in October
1993 might have come away from these two reviews under the impression that
MacKinnon was spearheading a revolution in constitutional thought.5 The
*Associate, Holleb & Coff, Chicago, Illinois; B.A. 1980, Ph.D. 1987, J.D. 1994,
Northwestern University. The author gratefully acknowledges helpful discussions with
Professors Anthony D'Amato, Robert Burns, Michael Perry and William Marshall.
Professor Martin Redish commented on earlier drafts and provided invaluable suggestions.
I Charles S. Peirce, Some Consequences of Four Incapacidtes, J. SpECULATIVE PHIL.
(1868), reprinted in 1 CHARLES S. PEIRCE, THE ESSENTIAL PEIRCE 28, 54 (Nathan Houser
& Christian Kloesel eds., 1992).
2 Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 275 (1952) (Black, I., dissenting).
3 CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS (1993).
4 Ronald Dworkin, Women and Pornography, N.Y. REv. OF BOOKS, Oct. 21, 1993, at
36, 40 (reviewing MACKINNON, supra note 3); Richard A. Posner, Obsession, NEW
REPUBLIC, Oct. 18, 1993, at 31, 32 (same).
5 Dworkin particularly gives this impression, calling MacKinnon's equality argument
both "striking" and "new." Dworkin, supra note 4, at 36, 40. And, truth be told,
MacKinnon does little to discourage such a notion. See MACKINNON, supra note 3, at 83
("No one to my knowledge has proposed that Congress prohibit hate propaganda to
effectuate the Fourteenth Amendment.").
Curiously, this very point became a subject of contention between the two when
MacKinnon wrote a letter responding to Dworkin's review of her book and Dworkin, in
turn, replied to the letter. See Pornography: An Exchange, N.Y. REv. OF BOOKS, Mar. 3,
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perception of a clash between free speech and one or another conception of
equality, however, is not novel in the legal literature.6 Yet it is true that while
calls for restricting certain kinds of speech in the service of equality have been
sounding for some years, the voices of these equalitarian critics, as I will refer
to them, have become both more numerous and more insistent of late. They
include commentators who, like MacKinnon, deplore the absence of regulations
on pornography and "hate speech" directed at women and minorities, 7 as well
as those, such as Cass Sunstein, who also favor subjecting broadcasting and
campaign financing to regulations aimed at producing something approaching
equal participation in politics.8
1994, at 47. MacKinnon, apparently not adverting to her own statement quoted in the
parenthetical of the preceding paragraph, upbraids Dworkin for calling "the equality
argument" new. Id. (MacKinnon's letter to the editors). Dworkin, for his part, readily
admits that there is nothing new about the general argument that "'every harm pornography
does is a harm of inequality.'" Id. at 48 (Dworkin's reply to MacKinnon's letter). He says
that he meant only that the "much more specific constitutional thesis" regarding the Equal
Protection Clause was new. Id. But see sources cited infra note 7.
6 For early examples of such concerns in the area of hate speech, see Loren P. Beth,
Group Libel and Free Speech, 39 MINN. L. REV. 167 (1955); Richard Delgado, Words that
Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 133 (1982), reprinted in MAIU I. MATSUDA ET AL., WORDS THAT WOUND:
CRIICAL RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 89, 90 (1993).
7 See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence III et al., Introduction, in MATSUDA ET AL., supra
note 6, at 1, 15 [hereinafter Lawrence, Introduction] ("The [Flirst [A]mendment is
employed to trump or nullify the only substantive meaning of the [E]qual [Pirotection
[C]lause, that the Constitution mandates the disestablishment of the ideology of racism.");
Mary Ellen Gale, Reimagining the First Amendment: Racist Speech and Equal Liberty, 65
ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 119, 154-64 (1991); Language as Violence v. Freedom of Expression:
Canadian and American Perspectives on Group Defadmon, 37 BUFF. L. REV. 337, 360
(1989) (remarks of Mari J. Matsuda) ("[T"he right of speech is meaningless to people who
do not have equality."); Charles R. Lawrence Ill, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating
Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431, reprinted in MATSUDA ET AL., supra note
6, at 53, 77 [hereinafter Lawrence, IfHe Hollers] ("[W]e see equality as a precondition of
free speech...."); Toni M. Massaro, Equality and Freedom of Expression: The Hate
Speech Dilemma, 32 WM. & MARY L. REv. 211, 265 (1991) ("Mhe liberal's high regard
for free expression presupposes several conditions that remain unmet.").
8 See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 81-
88, 94-101 (1993). Sunstein also discusses the demands of equality vis-k-vis hate speech, id.
at 193-208, and pornography, id. at 219-20.
Although the arguments from equality for circumscribing the reach of the First
Amendment arise in a number of contexts, it would be impossible to consider all of them in
any detail here. It will be useful, then, to take as a model the case based on concerns of
racial and gender equality. These arguments have been aired thoroughly, see, e.g., sources
cited supra notes 6-7, and so have been developed fully enough to include within them
[Vol. 56:427
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Most of these critics see the gains to be made in social equality as coming
at the expense of the right of free speech, at least as it has been conceptualized
in the modem tradition.9 While restrictions on directly coercive or intimidating
speech raise few problems under any theory of the First Amendment, these
critics include in their attacks speech that they believe frustrates the goal of
social equality because of its power to persuade. On this view, the First
Amendment must, in certain circumstances, give way under a balancing test-
or even be categorically subordinated-to the Fourteenth.' 0 Such arguments
have already provoked a number of responses from opponents who regard the
equalitarians' proposed balancing tests and revisionism as improper and
logically unfounded. 1' Yet even among most supporters of undiluted speech
rights, there persists the image of the Free Speech and Equal Protection
Clauses12 as potentially competing interests.13 In the rare instances in which
many of the lines of reasoning found in the equality claims fashioned in other settings. (For
an extensive "representative sample" of the hate speech literature, see the list of articles
compiled in Calvin R. Massey, Hate Speech, Cultural Diversity, and the Foundational
Paradigms of Free Expression, 40 UCLA L. REv. 103, 105-06 n.3 (1992)). This is not to
say that all equalitarian advocates-even those emphasizing gender and racial interests-
agree on every point of a single program for revising speech rights; nonetheless, their ideas
possess sufficient commonalities to make possible a broad outline of their shared enterprise.
9 See, e.g., MACKINNON, supra note 3, at 85 ("IThere never has been a fair fight in
the United States between equality and speech as two constitutional values .... ");
SUNSTEIN, supra note 8, at 193 ("When speech helps contribute to the creation of a caste
system, the state can legitimately and neutrally attempt to respond .... ."); Lawrence, IfHe
Hollers, supra note 7, at 434 ("At the center of the controversy is a tension between the
constitutional values of free speech and equality."); see also sources cited supra note 7.
10 MACKINNON, supra note 3, at 71 (suggesting that the Civil War Amendments
"perhaps even demand reconstruction of the speech right itself"); Frank I. Michelman,
Conceptions of Democracy in American Constitutional Argument: The Case of Pornography
Regulation, 56 TENN. L. REv. 291, 306-08 (1989).
11 See, e.g., Anthony D'Amato, Harmfid Speech and the Culture of Indetenninacy, 32
WM. &MARY L. REv. 329, 332 (1991); Terry Heinrichs, The Cvil Libertarian as Censor:
"Public Response" Reconsidered, 56 ALB. L. REV. 337, 340 (1992); Peter Limzer, A White
Liberal Looks at Racist Speech, 65 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 119 (1991); Massey, supra note 8;
Bert Neuborne, Ghosts in the Attic: Idealized Pluralism, Community, and Hate Speech, 27
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 339 (1992); Nadine Strossen, Regulating Racist Speech on
Campus: A Modest Proposal?, 1990 DuKE L.. 484.
12 Respectively, they read as follows:
Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech ....
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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commentators have attempted to reconcile the two constitutional provisions as
part of their defense of free speech, they have properly relied on an alternative
vision of equality: the concept of self-rule, of which the First Amendment is an
important element and which dictates that citizens must be equally free to
participate in their own governance.14 But even these critics do not sufficiently
explain the relationship between the two visions of equality or, indeed, why
proponents of social equality should be willing to abandon their position in
favor of the type of equality that some have suggested is embodied in the right
of free speech.
For these reasons, stating a coherent theory of equality that comprehends
the significance of speech calls for a limning of the most basic foundations of
the right of free speech. The ultimate inquiry will be this: Does the speech
right protect precisely the same human characteristics that underlie the goals of
social equality? If so, then suppressing speech as a means of achieving social
equality is a logical impossibility. In other words, if it can be demonstrated
that, absent the human qualities that depend upon speech, social equality would
No state shall... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws.
Id. amend. XIV, § 1.
13 The most sustained consideration of the presumed conflict between speech and
equality appears in recent works by Robert Post. See, e.g., Robert C. Post, Between
Democracy and Conmunity: The Legal Constitution of Social Form, in 35 [DEMOCRATIC
COMMUNITY] NoMos 163 (John W. Chapman & Ian Shapiro eds., 1993) [hereinafter Post,
Between Democracy and Convnunity]; Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public
Discourse: Outrageous Opinion, Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v.
Falwell, 103 HARV. L. Rnv. 603 (1990) [hereinafter Post, Constitutional Concept]; Robert
C. Post, Free Speech and Religious, Racial, and Sexual Harassment: Racist Speech,
Democracy and the First Amendment, 32 WM. & MARY L. REv. 267 (1991) [hereinafter
Post, Free Speech]; Robert C. Post, Meiklejohn's Mistake: Individual Autonomy and the
Reform of Public Discourse, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 1109 (1993) [hereinafter Post,
Meiklejohn's Mistake]. While Post is, to say the least, ambivalent about the amenability of
the conflict to satisfactory resolution, he generally opposes the subordination of speech
rights to demands for social equality. See, e.g., Post, Free Speech, supra, at 314-17.
14 See, e.g., Post, Free Speech, supra note 13, at 292-93 (arguing that elevating the
Fourteenth Amendment over the First requires some source of governing authority, an
"Interpreter" other than "the people" and that "[tihe impossibility of locating such an
Interpreter suggests the difficulties that attend the argument from the [Flourteenth
[A]mendment"). Ronald Dworkin has been the most explicit in suggesting that speech rights
can be defended as embracing a kind of equality right. See Dworkin, supra note 4, at 42
("First Amendment liberty is not equality's enemy, but the other side of equality's coin.");
see also Kenneth L. Karst, Equality as a Central Puinciple in the First Amendment, 43 U.
CHI. L. REv. 20 (1975) (arguing for equal liberty of expression).
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be left without any logical basis to recommend it, then the Equal Protection
Clause cannot be understood to dominate-or even to clash with-free speech
protection. This Article seeks to establish such an inextricable linkage.
Part II traces the nature of speech to its deepest functional roots and finds
that, understood as the capacity for and exercise of conceptual thought, it
emerges as the single important feature responsible for making human beings
human. Drawing on the ideas of the pragmatist philosopher Charles Peirce,
particularly as developed by Walker Percy, this Part examines the significance
of the triadic nature of speech. Speech creates an irreducible relationship
among three elements-a thing (object), a word (sign), and a person who
understands the word as standing for the thing (interpretant). 5 By virtue of this
relationship, speech stands in a unique position when contrasted with all other
phenomena in the universe, which involve, in however complex a combination,
only the "dyadic relations" of two things interacting with one another.' 6 This
uniqueness matters because it is the triadic event of speech that makes possible
not only the exchange of meaning with others, but also the consciousness of
meaning within one's own self.17 In a word, speech is the source of-or rather,
the very content of-the human self, and freedom of speech is the key to self-
realization, the flourishing of the self. As such, it is the single animating force
behind each of the myriad of values, such as autonomy, dignity of the
individual, moral agency, and the like, that have been suggested as the bases
for fundamental rights.' 8 Through speech, the self creates itself by inquiring
into and coming to a knowledge of the nature of the reality of the external
world and deciding how best to live in that world.
15 The terminology will be recognized as one of a number of variations coming out of
semiotics, the science of signs. See WALKER PERCY, LOST IN THE CosMos 86-88 n.*
(1983).
16 From the beginning and for most of the fifteen billion years of the life of the
Cosmos, there was only one kind of event. It was particles hitting particles,
chemical reactions, energy exchanges, gravity attractions between masses, field
forces, and so on.... Even a system as inconceivably vast as the Cosmos itself
can be understood as such an interaction .... Every element in the Cosmos is in
interaction with every other element.
PERCY, supra note 15, at 85-87; see also WALKER PERCY, THE MESSAGE IN THE BOTTLE
161-62 (1975) [hereinafter PERCY, MESSAGE IN THE BoTTLE] 0aying out Peirce's original
conception).
17 See VINCENT M. COLAPIErRO, PEIRCE'S APPROACH TO THE SELF 37-38, 90-91
(1989).
18 See id. at 67-68 (stating that "Peirce's notion of the self provides a basis for
autonomy-in particular, for the level of self-control that distinguishes the human animal
from other animals").
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Part m makes the crucial connection between rights of social equality and
speech as the preeminent fundamental right. Notwithstanding the suggestions of
some scholars to the contrary, 19 fundamental rights, particularly the speech
right, can profitably be understood as the wellhead of the normative value of
social equality. 20 The statement that social equality ought to exist among all
people necessarily entails the proposition that all people are in fact alike in the
particular respect that, according to an independent prescriptive standard,
determines the social treatment that each individual should receive. 21 Social
equalitarians make a prescriptive judgment, uncontestable in view of the
Fourteenth Amendment, that government must treat all persons as equals.
Argument may well ensue over what the principle of equal treatment demands
(a "color blind" Constitution versus affirmative action, for example), but the
salient issue here arises prior to such disputes and it cannot be understood by
simple reference to the Equal Protection Clause.
The basis of descriptive equality that underlies and so legitimizes the
prescriptive case for social equality is nothing other than the fact that all
persons possess a human self, the self being constituted by the speech capacity,
which all human beings have in equal measure.22 The speech right itself thus
protects the logical basis of the aspiration to social equality.23 However one
comes out on issues of the proper reach of the Equal Protection Clause, this
fact serves to rule out one means of achieving the Clause's goals. To anyone
but a First Amendment absolutist, restrictions on speech will sometimes be
justified by other rationales in certain circumstances; however, the decision to
outlaw speech as a method of attaining social equality weakens the very
structure upon which the prescription for social equality itself stands. To argue
19 See, e.g., PETER WESTEN, SPEAKING OF EQUALITY 122-27 (1990); James W.
Nickel, Dworldn on the Nature and Consequences of Rights, 11 GA. L. REv. 1115, 1129
(1977).
2 0 In addition to the sources cited supra note 14, see Gregory Vlastos, Justice and
Equality (1962), reprinted in THEORmS OF RIGHTS 41, 51-67 (Jeremy Waldron ed., 1984);
Jeremy Waldron, Jurisprudence and Political Theory: The Substance of Equality, 89 MICH.
L. REv. 1350, 1358-62 (1991) (reviewing WESTEN, supra note 19).
21 See WESTEN, supra note 19, at 86-87, 122-23; Waldron, supra note 20, at 1353-
55; infra notes 133-34 and accompanying text.
22 The equal capacity for speech is not to be confused with equal facility or talent in
making use of the speech capacity. See infra notes 166-68 and accompanying text.
23 C. Ronald Dworkin, Liberalism, in PUBLIC AND PRrvATE MORALrrY 113, 125-26
(Stuart Hampshire ed., 1978) (arguing that equal distribution of resources is a derivative
principle subject to limitation by the constitutive principle of treatment of all people with
equal concern and respect); see also Stanley L Benn, Egalitarianism and the Equal
Consideration of Interests, in 9 [EQUALrrIY NOMOS 61, 67-68 (J. Roland Pennock & John
W. Chapman eds., 1967); Waldron, supra note 20, at 1362.
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otherwise is to advocate breaking up the cornerstone to provide material for an
additional story on the edifice of equality.
Part IV takes up an objection that social equalitarians might make to the
conclusions of Parts II and IM. The equalitarians might grant that the self truly
is the ultimate justification for their advocacy of social equality; but, they could
maintain, an accurate understanding of the self would recognize that exposure
to particular species of speech erodes the self, weakening its ability to achieve
realization.2 4 Defenders of the speech right in this context have turned most
often to democratic theory to suggest that the political equality of persons in the
marketplace of speech, the adjunct of the voting booth, forbids censorship on
these grounds.25 The equalitarians, however, refuse to accept a vision of
democracy that would, in the name of democracy, allow the social
subordination of women and minorities, though it may result only from the
ideas contained in speech. Some have thus indicated their belief that the
command of the Fourteenth Amendment functions to limit these basic
democratic principles where social equality is at stake.26 But the idea of
suspending the operation of democracy as it is manifested in the freedom of
speech raises a fundamental problem. No principled basis exists upon which to
limit the suspension to one issue such as social equality, however important or
narrowly drawn. Were it to be accepted that democracy via speech is only a
contingent requirement of our form of government, dispensable in areas of
overriding concern, the delineation of those areas in which free speech is
intolerable would, by default, be left to whomever was in power. There are
simply no logical intermediate steps between the well-intentioned position of
the social equalitarians and a descent into total authoritarianism.
Yet the usefulness of democratic theory in this context is not limited to
exposing the fatal weakness of the equalitarian argument. The conception of
speech as the key to the worth of the individual, developed in Parts II and 1I,
can illuminate the positive substantive content of the often-expressed idea of
speech as a right of political equality. 27 While speech undeniably serves an
2 4 Too often victims of hate speech find themselves without the words to articulate what
they see, feel, and know. In the absence of theory and analysis that give them a
diagnosis and a name for the injury they have suffered, they internalize the injury done
them and are rendered silent in the face of continuing injury.
Lawrence, Introduction, supra note 7, at 13.
25 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
26 See Lawrence, Introduction, supra note 7, at 15; MACKINNON, supra note 3, at 72.
27 See, e.g., Dworkin, supra note 4, at 41 ("[T]he First Amendment's egalitarian
role... forbids censoring cranks or neo-Nazis . . . because equality demands that
everyone, no matter how eccentric or despicable, have a chance to influence policies as well
1995]
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instrumental purpose for the operation of democracy, this is not the essence of
the relationship. Indeed, the true causal dynamic runs in precisely the opposite
direction: properly understood, free speech is not justified (or not primarily
justified) by the choice of democracy as a system, but rather the choice of
democracy is justified by the valuable properties of speech. As speech is the
source of the individual self, it is also the source of the polity's self. It provides
a means of acquiring knowledge as a basis upon which society's decisions can
be initially made and subsequently reevaluated. Just as the individual self uses
speech to gain knowledge toward planning its life, the communal self seeks an
understanding of the reality of the world as a means to make the exercise of its
will effective, thriving through the larger conversation of the polity. While the
individual cannot hope to complete its process of discovering the totality of
external reality, such a discovery, in Charles Peirce's conception, is precisely
the goal of the infinitely ongoing communal effort, and it can be achieved only
through the combined efforts of individuals. 28
The aim of a democratic society is no less ambitious than to increase
knowledge and thereby to enable its citizens, together and individually, to
determine their conception of the good life, continuously redefining it on the
most comprehensive basis possible. Speech does not merely enable this
process, it is the process. And while the acquisition of knowledge through the
polity's dialogue may at times be difficult and even painful, 29 such pain-far
from inimical to the self-realization process-is an unavoidable part of it. In a
profound sense then, speech is the engine of political self-determination; and if
this is the case, free speech principles in fact drive-rather than derive from-
the Constitution's insistence on political equality. Promoting social equality at
the expense of speech risks not just the democratic system but any system of
government that would hope to place the essence of humanity at its center. The
inevitable conclusion is this: If efforts made in a quest for social equality are
permitted to impinge on the freedom of speech, those efforts will prove to be,
in more senses than one, self-defeating.
as elections."); see also Karst, supra note 14, at 52-59; Post, Free Speech, supra note 13,
at 279-85; Post, Meildejohn'Mistake, supra note 13, at 1116-18.28 See infra notes 228-34 and accompanying text.
29 See Ronald Dworldn, The Coming Battles over Free Speech, N.Y. REv. OF BOOKS,
June 11, 1992, at 55, 61 (reviewing ANTHONY LEWiS, MAKE NO LAW: TiE SULLIVAN CASE
AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1991)) ("Every powerful and controversial idea has a
potential negative impact on someone's self-esteem.").
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I. SPEECH AND THE SELF
The truth is that man's capacity for symbol-mongering in general and
language in particular is so intimately part and parcel of his being human, of
his perceiving and knowing, of his very consciousness itself, that it is all but
impossible for him to focus on the magic prism through which he sees
everything else.
Walker Percy30
A. Theoretical Beginnings
For those who favor restricting speech that degrades women and racial and
ethnic minorities, the questions of the inherent character of speech and the
consequent reasons for its protection are of something less than paramount
concern. 31 Whatever the framers of the First Amendment were about, these
commentators seem to imply, we cannot now accept the idea that oppression
and subordination of the powerless is any part of the constitutional purpose of
free speech, particularly in light of the adoption of the more recent (and so
controlling32) Fourteenth Amendment. Most often, the closest that equalitarian
critics get to an exploration of the purpose of speech rights is an identification
of categories of speech unprotected under current doctrine, followed by a
construction and extension of the exceptions to allow for the measures the
critics propose.33 Such a limited approach to the theoretical issues at hand
cannot be expected to lay a stable foundation for a wholesale alteration of the
generally accepted view of the Free Speech Clause. However one comes out on
the ultimate issue, surely some sustained inquiry into the reasons for protecting
speech is in order.
Of course, this question has hardly languished from inattention in the
general scholarship. Of those broad justifications for free speech that have been
advanced, the present argument attaches the greatest significance to that which
3 0 PBRCY, MESSAGE IN THEBOTLE, supra note 16, at 29.
31 In this body of the literature, the most extensive discussion of the theoretical basis of
First Amendment doctrine (although not of speech itself) occurs in Mar J. Matsuda, Public
Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MIcH. L. REv. 2320 (1989),
reprinted in MATSUDA ET AL., supra note 6, at 17, 31-35. Even so, the passage amounts to
little more than a nod in the direction of what is presented as a questionable tradition.32 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
33 See, e.g., Lawrence, IfHe Hollers, supra note 7, at 66-71 (section entitled "Racist
Speech as the Functional Equivalent of Fighting Words"); Cass R. Sunstein, Pornography
and the First Amendment, 1986 DuKx L.J 589, 613-17 (analogizing harms of pornography
to those of other types of unprotected speech).
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several commentators have denominated variously as "individual self-
fulfillment,"3 4 the "liberty model," 35 and "individual self-realization." 36
Although these theories, as developed by their respective sponsors, are marked
by differences and distinctions among them, they share the core proposition
that speech is singled out by the Constitution for special protection because of
its unique role in allowing the individual to define herself. As influential as this
position has been, however, it has not escaped objections. The aim of this Part
is to provide a description of the deep structure of the function of speech and in
so doing answer those objections in a way that ultimately clarifies the full
import of the relationship of speech to social equality.
The importance of speech for self-realization has been recognized by the
Supreme Court, but that recognition has been intermittent and uncertain. This
ideal of self-realization finds its most explicit statement in the concurrence of
Justice Brandeis in Whitney v. California:37 "Those who won our independence
believed that the final end of the State was to make men free to develop their
faculties .... They valued liberty both as an end and as a means." 38 To the
degree that freedom of speech is valued as an end, that end is self-realization,
the development of human faculties. 39 The Court's more modem free speech
34 See Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72
YALEL.J. 877, 879-81 (1963).
35 See C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA
L. REv. 964, 964 (1978).
3 6 See MARTIN H. REDISH, FREEDOM oF XPRESSION 11 (1984).
37 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
3 8 Id. at 372 (Brandeis, L, joined by Holmes, J., concurring).
39 See Dworkin, supra note 29, at 57 (calling Brandeis's statement "a classic
endorsement of the constitutive view" of speech). Dworkin also quotes Anthony Lewis's
judgment that this passage is "the most profound statement ever made about the premises of
the First Amendment." Id. at n.9.
Not everyone reads this passage the same way, however. Professor Sunstein agrees
that Brandeis finds both an intrinsic and instrumental value in speech. But for Sunstein, the
intrinsic value, while still called liberty, is construed to be limited to a liberty "to be able to
develop one's capacities in a way that promotes courage, self-mastery, virtue." SUNSTEIN,
supra note 8, at 28. But Brandeis's opinion views liberty in this context, not as restricted in
this way, but rather as "that freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think."
Whtey, 274 U.S. at 372. While Brandeis is undeniably optimistic about the ultimate results
of allowing such freedom, he does not delimit it to only that which will produce certain
results. Sunstein's notion of the freedom to speak recalls the choice of automobile color
given to Henry Ford's customers-you can think and say anything you want, so long as it
promotes virtue.
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opinions, though, have made much less of this rationale than did Brandeis. 4°
While cases such as West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,41
Wooley v. Maynard,42 and Stanley v. Georgia43 have supplied additional
classic affirmations of the First Amendment's purpose of protecting speech as a
way of ensuring "individual freedom of mind," 44 it has been left largely to the
commentators to explain and promote the theory of self-realization.
In a celebrated essay, Thomas Emerson suggested four values behind the
constitutional protection of speech: (1) individual self-fulfillment, (2) attainment
of truth, (3) participation in decision-making, and (4) balance between stability
and change. 45 The present argument, while it envisions a role for each of these
values, sees self-fulfillment as primary, giving rise to the others. Emerson hints
at a similar conclusion both by listing this value first and by affirming "the
widely accepted premise of Western thought that the proper end of man is the
realization of his character and potentialities as a human being." 46 This
realization takes place principally in the mind and is most facilitated, Emerson
states, by the exercise of the capacity to form and express opinions and
beliefs. 47 In this way, the First Amendment creates an enclave for expression
and treats speech differently from other forms of human action, exempting it
from society's usual powers of control on the ground that "it is not a general
measure of the individual's right to freedom of expression that any particular
exercise of the right may be thought to promote or retard other goals of the
society." 4s
40 See Dworkin, supra note 29, at 57-58 (discussing as imprudent Justice Brennan's
reliance, in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), almost exclusively on the
instrumental rather than the constitutive value of speech).
41 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
42 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
43 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
44 Wooley, 430 U.S. at 714. Barnette includes an often quoted casting of this idea: "If
there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty,
can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of
opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein." Barnette, 319 U.S. at
642. And Stanley held that "the power to control men's minds" and "the right to control the
moral content of a person's thoughts" are "wholly inconsistent with the philosophy of the
First Amendment." Stanley, 394 U.S. at 565-66.
45 Emerson, supra note 34, at 878-86; see also THOMAS EMERsON, THE SYSTEM OF
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6-7 (1970) [hereinafter EMERsON, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION].
46 Emerson, supra note 34, at 879.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 880. The discussion, infra, in Part III will argue that while no "particular
exercise of the right" is to be measured by its contribution to a predetermined, substantive
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Edwin Baker, in expatiating on his "liberty theory" of speech, looks to two
of Emerson's four values, self-fulfillment and participation in societal decision-
making, explaining the remaining two as "derivative." 49 The two favored
values, Baker reasons, demonstrate that a correct interpretation of the right to
free speech would "delineate] a realm of individual liberty roughly
corresponding to noncoercive, nonviolent action" protecting speech "because
of the way the protected conduct fosters individual self-realization and self-
determination without improperly interfering with the legitimate claims of
others." 50 Martin Redish also considers Emerson's framework, along with the
theories of other scholars, and concludes that "the constitutional guarantee of
free speech ultimately serves only one true value, ... 'individual self-
realization'" and that the many suggested alternative values, while valid, "are
in reality subvalues of self-realization." 51 For Redish, the fact that "all forms
of expression that further the self-realization value" are constitutionally
protected is objectively demonstrable by reference to our chosen form of
democratic government. 52
Thus, all three theories hinge upon the idea that speech, as distinguished
from other forms of action in degree if not in kind,53 bestows upon people a
power to create themselves. Yet, this claim of singularity has time and again
been doubted. Frederick Schauer, for example, pointedly asked the question,
"Must Speech Be Special?" 54 While in Schauer's view the First Amendment's
language itself makes it clear that speech is prescriptively special, the more
difficult question remains whether speech is special descriptively, whether any
hypothesis of speech's nature can satisfactorily separate it from other kinds of
conduct so as to merit the different treatment commanded by the First
Amendment. The answer to that question, according to Schauer, "is probably
'No,'" 55 creating a logical inconsistency between reality and the constitutional
mandate requiring further scholarly attention. Robert Bork, among others, has
expounded a similar view, arguing that all of the underlying justifications put
end, the exercise of the individual right is what makes possible the achievement of
Emerson's other three values.
49 Baker, supra note 35, at 991.
5 0 Id. at 964, 966.
51 REDISH, supra note 36, at 11-12. The term self-realization, as used by Redish, may
include a wider range of phenomena than is meant by Emerson or Baker: "[I]t can be
interpreted to refer either to development of the individuals' [sic] powers and
abilities... or to the individual's control of his or her own destiny through making life-
affecting decisions .... I intend to include both interpretations." Id. at 11.
52 1d. at 12.
53 See Emerson, supra note 34, at 879; REDISH, supra note 36, at 18-19.
54 Frederick Schauer, Must Speech Be Special?, 78 Nw. U. L. REV. 1284 (1983).
55 Id. at 1306.
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forth for speech rights, with the sole exception of enhancement of political
discourse, fail to explain what speech does that other human activities cannot
do. 56 And recently, Stanley Fish has taken the argument to its extreme,
suggesting that speech is entirely indistinguishable from other action and that
protecting speech can have no purpose other than to protect some underlying
political program favored by those who have the power to manipulate First
Amendment doctrine.57 "Speech, in short, is never a value in and of itself,"
Fish says, "but is always produced within the precincts of some assumed
conception of the good to which it must yield in the event of conflict." 58 When
it comes to defining speech rights, Fish insists that we are all
5 6 Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND.
L.J. 1, 25 (1971) (arguing that the benefits of speech in developing individuals' faculties
are... indistinguishable from the functions or benefits of all other human activity).
Curiously, Bork goes on to suggest that only political speech is protected by the First
Amendment, since speech's "ability to deal explicitly, specifically and directly with politics
and government, is different from any other form of human activity." Id. at 26. On the
contradiction in Bork's analysis, see REDISH, supra note 36, at 17 ("Bork's conclusion that
political speech should be protected is, however, inconsistent with his belief that any
acceptable rationale for free speech must be logically unique to speech. For there are
countless actions... that can be thought to convey very significant political messages.").
Redish's comment on the inconsistency in Bork's reasoning does not, however, in itself
explain why speech is unique in this regard, and Bork's point continues to be made by
others. See, e.g., FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSoPI-cAL ENQUIRY 57
(1982) ("The fact that communication will produce the desired result does not mean that
that same result cannot also be produced by experiences."); Baker, supra note 35, at 975
("The problem with this defense is that the individual is as likely to find needed information
in experiences as in speech."); Stanley Ingber, The Markeplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing
Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J 1, 78 ("As a liberation of the human spirit, speech is no more pivotal
than is any other human activity."). Both Emerson and Redish do attempt to answer this
charge, saying essentially that speech tends to cause less harm than action. EMERSON,
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, supra note 45, at 9; REDISH, supra note 36, at 18-19; see also
Kent Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifications, 89 COLUM. L. Rnv. 119, 138 (1989) ("The
wider applicability of a reason for protecting liberty would not necessarily undercut its
relevance for a distinctive free speech principle; the reason might have a special intensity
for speech or coalesce in a special way with other reasons in respect to speech.").
57 See STANLEY FISH, THERE'S No SUCH TING AS FREE SPEECH 106 (1994) ("[M]nsofar
as the point of the First Amendment is to identify speech separable from conduct and from
the consequences that come in conduct's wake, there is no such speech and therefore
nothing for the First Amendment to protect."); see also id. at 16 ("Mhe First Amendment
does not... direct a politics but will display the political 'spin' of whatever group has its
hand on the interpretive machinery."); Stanley Fish, Fraught with Death: Skepticism,
Progressivism, and the First Amendment, 64 U. COLO. L. REv. 1061 (1993).
58 FISH, supra note 57, at 104.
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consequentialists. 59 The project for the remainder of this Part is to offer a basis
for understanding speech that overcomes the objections of these critics of the
self-realization value and, more specifically, supplies the basis of a defense of
speech rights against infringement in the name of social equality.
B. Speech and Being Human
Speech is special. As a descriptive matter, speech is not only different in
kind from all other human activity but also unlike literally any other sort of
event in the universe. What is more, the way in which speech is special
correlates precisely with the reasons why it deserves greater constitutional
protection than is accorded to other types of conduct. The capacity for and the
practice of intentionally communicative activities give meaning to words and
phrases such as human rights, human dignity, moral agency, the sacredness of
the individual, and autonomy. In fine, speech is what makes human beings
significantly human.
These are bold claims, more empirical than theoretical, and their
persuasiveness will depend upon the strength of the evidence that can be
adduced to support them. The works of one writer, Walker Percy, focus
intently on the question of the significance of speech,60 and the results have
much to offer for an understanding of the theoretical value of speech and the
constitutional consequences thereof. Percy notes that the essence of the
phenomenon of language has gone largely unexplained: while the layman is
uninterested, 61 scientists have minutely explored the physiological properties of
the speech act and the structural nature of language, but have nothing
whatsoever to say about "the actual event of language[, t]he central
59 Id. at 13-15. But see Dworkin, supra note 29, at 61 n.18 (responding that Fish
"confuses people's reasons for speaking, which are of course to promote some other
purpose, with the reasons government might have for protecting their right to speak, which
may include constitutive as well as instrumental reasons").
6 0 It might be said that Percy was peculiarly equipped for the task of looking at and
explaining the phenomenon of language. A scientist, a physician by training, he spent at
least 35 years (until his death in 1990) writing what is sometimes called technical philosophy
about the subject of human communication. And for the last 30 years or so of this period,
he also wrote novels, using language to explain what it means to be human. See Patrick H.
Samway, S.J., Introduc'on, in WALKER PERCY, SIGNPOSTS IN A STRANGE LAND ix, x-xi
(Patrick Samway ed., 1991).
61 "Since [the layman] is a languaged creature and sees everything through the mirror
of language, asking him to consider the nature of language is like asking a fish to consider
the nature of water. He cannot imagine its absence, so he cannot consider its presence."
Walker Percy, Questions They Never Asked Me, ESQUIRE, Dec. 1977, reprinted in PERCY,
supra note 60, at 397, 419-20.
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phenomenon[, w]hat happens when people talk, when one person names
something or says a sentence about something and another person understands
him." 62 In light of this situation, it is not surprising that supporters of the
various versions of the self-realization value of speech have been forced to rely
on the mere intuition, the more or less commonsensical proposition, that speech
is importantly different from other human activities.63 Neither is it surprising
that other critics' doubts about and denials of that same intuition 64 have
resulted in the discussion coming to something of a stalemate. But this need not
be the case.
Percy's approach is quite different from the traditional analysis of free
speech issues; indeed, his interest in speech is entirely unrelated to legal and
constitutional questions. Yet if the approach is different, it is in fact an attempt
to get at the same questions from the other side of the problem. Instead of
taking the current doctrinal scope of the speech right as a starting point and
then finding reasons based in political theory upon which either to contract or
expand the right, Percy's method offers something much closer to the attitude
of the scientist who observes a particular behavior and seeks to explain it. So
despite-or perhaps because of-the difference in approach, the resulting
explanation of the phenomenon of human speech, root and branch, might prove
a valuable tool, previously unavailable to those interested in the theoretical
basis of the First Amendment.
Of course, even a scientist will have a motivation for selecting the subject
of her observation. Percy's motive in this matter, far from unrelated, is nearly
identical to the concerns of proponents of the self-realization theories of speech.
Percy is interested in understanding the human capacity for language, because
he believes that such an understanding is the only way to formulate a tenable
theory of human beings. He identifies the two currently governing and
simultaneously-held general theories: (1) the scientific view of the human being
as an organism in an environment, not qualitatively different from other
6 2 PERCY, MESSAGE INTHEBOTTLE, supra note 16, at 13-14.
It is as if neither Dr. Harvey nor anyone else had ever discovered that the heart is
a pump and that the blood circulates but in the past three hundred years scientists had
amassed huge quantities of data about the chemical reaction of heart muscle, and the
composition of blood, had described the distribution of the elements of blood, had made
comparisons of the blood systems of thousands of mammals, and, finally, had
developed a sophisticated computerized method for calculating the velocity and pressure
of the blood in any given artery.
Id. at 15.
63 See supra notes 45-53 and accompanying text.
64 See supra notes 54-59 and accompanying text.
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organisms, and (2) the "attenuated legacy of Christianity," which sees people
as uniquely possessed of "certain inalienable rights,... [with the] consequence
[that] the highest value to which a democratic society can be committed is the
respect of the sacredness and worth of the individual." 65 These two theories,
accepted in combination as they currently are, suggest a conventional wisdom
that is "radically incoherent." 66 The way out of the dilemma, according to
Percy, is through study of the activity in which humans spend the better part of
their time, "which even Darwin agreed sets them apart from the beasts," 67 and
yet about which we know almost nothing:
Instead of marking [man] down at the outset as besouled creature or responding
organism, why not look at him as he appears, not even as Homo sapiens,
because attributing sapience already begs the question, but as Homo loquens,
man the talker, or Homo symbolificus, man the symbol-monger? Instead of
starting out with such large vexed subjects as soul, mind, ideas, consciousness,
why not begin with language, which no one denies, and see how far it takes us
toward the rest?68
Language, one of the two things about which scientists do not have an adequate
theory, might thus be the key to the other thing about which scientists also lack
a theory, i.e., the human animal.
For Percy, the key to the natures both of language and of human beings is
to be found in a scene from the life of the eight-year-old Helen Keller, one
familiar to many perhaps from the film or theatrical version of the story. The
significance of the scene, however, is most clearly revealed by Helen Keller's
own telling of the incident in her autobiography, and it is worth reproducing
here. In his discussion of the passage, Percy reminds us that from the time in
her infancy when she had been struck both blind and deaf until the moment
recounted below, "Helen had learned to respond like any other good animal:
When she wanted a piece of cake, she spelled the word in [her teacher] Miss
Sullivan's hand and Miss Sullivan fetched her the cake .... Then Miss
Sullivan took her for a walk."69
We walked down the path to the well-house, attracted by the fragrance of
the honeysuckle with which it was covered. Someone was drawing water and
my teacher placed my hand under the spout. As the cool stream gushed over
one hand, she spelled into the other the word water, first slowly then rapidly. I
65 PiRcy, MESSAGE IN THE BoTrLE, supra note 16, at 20.
66 Id.
6 7 Id. at 16.
68 Id. at 17.
69 Id. at 34.
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stood still, my whole attention fixed upon the motion of her fingers. Suddenly
I felt a misty consciousness as of something forgotten-a thrill of returning
thought; and somehow the mystery of language was revealed to me. I knew
then that "w-a-t-e-r" meant the wonderful cool something that was flowing
over my hand. That living word awakened my soul, gave it light, hope, joy,
set it free! There were barriers still, it is true, but barriers that could in time be
swept away.
I left the well-house eager to learn. Everything had a name, and each name
gave birth to a new thought. As we returned to the house every object which I
touched seemed to quiver with life. That was because I saw everything with the
strange, new sight that had come to me. On entering the door, I remembered
the doll I had broken. [She had earlier destroyed the doll in a fit of temper.] I
felt my way to the hearth and picked up the pieces. I tried vainly to put them
together. Then my eyes filled with tears; for I realized what I had done, and
for the first time I felt repentance and sorrow.
I learned a great many new words that day. I do not remember what they
all were; but I do know that motherfather, sister, teacher were among them-
words that were to make the world blossom for me, "like Aaron's rod with
flowers." It would have been difficult to find a happier child than I was as I lay
in my crib at the close of that eventful day and lived over the joys it had
brought me, and for the first time longed for a new day to come. 70
Helen Keller's entry into a world of speech took her from being "a good
responding organism[,]... little more than an animal" to being a "symbol-
mongering human[,] ... wholly human." 71 Percy notes that not only does this
scene compress the "months of the naming phase" of the normal human two-
year-old but also, "if the biologist's motto were true and ontogeny does
recapitulate phylogeny, then Helen's breakthrough must bear some relation to
the breakthrough of the species itself."72 In the story of Helen Keller's
"rebirth" into the world of language, Percy finds an encapsulation of the event
that might hold the answer to his question. 73 In trying to understand what
happens when a creature becomes able to name its world, a power quite
different from any other the creature possesses, and-crucial for the issue of the
First Amendment-in trying to understand the results that flow from that
power, Percy made a kind of discovery. It was a discovery that he later learned
70 HELEN KELLER, TIM STORY OFMY LIFE (1965), quoted in PERCY, MESSAGE IN THE
BOTrLE, supra note 16, at 34-35 (editorial insertion in PERCY).
71 PERCY, MESSAGE INTHEBOTrLE, supra note 16, at 38; see also PERCY, supra note
60, at 281 ("It was nothing less than the beginning of her life as a person.").72 PERCY, MESSAGE IN THEBOTrLE, supra note 16, at 38.
73 "It was like holding a test tube of pure uranium which had been smelted from
thousands of tons of ore-bearing rock. I was looking straight at it, but what to make of it?"
Id.
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had been made by Charles Peirce at the turn of the century, although "no one
had paid much attention, not even Peirce's greatest admirers." 74 It is Peirce's
explication of the nature and effects of the speech phenomenon, together with
Percy's grasp of the implications of this work, that allow us to see both that
speech is special and why, as a constitutional matter, we should care.
C. The Triadic Nature of Speech
1. The Mechanism of Speech
Speech is distinguished from all other human activities-from all other
events of any kind-in the following way. Every nonspeech phenomenon in the
universe can be termed, in Peirce's word, dyadic.
An event A, may, by brute force, produce an event, B; and then the event, B,
may in its turn produce a third event, C. The fact that event, C, is about to be
produced by B has no influence at all upon the production of B by A. It is
impossible that it should, since the action of B in producing C is a contingent
future event at the time B is produced. Such is dyadic action, which is so called
because each step of it concerns a pair of objects. 75
As Walker Percy explains, this concept encompasses all natural phenomena as
well as all nonspeech events effected by and upon humans. 76 Even the life
processes of organisms and the interactions among organisms, though different
in many ways from other natural occurrences, are nothing but more complex
variations of dyadic relations. Indeed, Percy maintains that animal behavior that
is often likened to and even held up in fact to be speech is nothing but a
sequence of dyads. 77
Human expression through the use of signs, what Peirce calls semiosis, is
not dyadic, but triadic, since it "involves ... a cooperation of three subjects,
such as a sign, its object, and its interpretant, this tri-relative influence not
74 Id. at 39; see also CHRISTOPHER HOOKWAY, PEiRcn 120 (1985) (stating that Peirce's
study of semiotics "provides a fundamental and illuminating academic discipline with a
promise that was heralded by Peirce but lost to much of twentieth-century philosophy").
75 5 CHARLEs S. PEIRCE, COLLECrED PAPERS OF CHARLEs SANDERS PEIRCE 472
(Charles Hartshorne & Paul Weiss eds., 1931-1935).
76 See supra note 16; see also PERCY, supra note 15, at 87 ("The planet Saturn has an
influence upon me; it exerts a small gravitational attraction. I in turn exert a slight pull not
only on the planet Saturn but upon the entire M31 galaxy in Andromeda.").
7 7 Id. at 92-95 (explaining the so-called language of animals trained by behavioralists
as learned responses not qualitatively different from Pavlov's dogs). Peirce himself is in
accord with such a view. See 5 PEiRcE, supra note 75, 533.
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being in any way resolvable into actions between pairs." 78 When a person (the
interpretant) understands a word (the sign) to stand for a thing (the object), she
is partaking in speech activity, which cannot be understood as or broken down
into a series of dyadic events: the process of speech embraces all three elements
irreducibly. 79 The difference between dyadic and triadic behavior can be
highlighted by reference to Helen Keller's breakthrough into language. 80 Percy
points out that before her breakthrough, when her teacher spelled the word
"cake" in her hand, Helen responded by looking for cake, much as a dog,
hearing its master say the word "ball," might run in search of a ball. But after
the incident in the well-house, Helen knew that the word "water," spelled into
her one hand, meant-was the name for-the liquid that was simultaneously
pouring over her other hand and, further, "[s]he then wanted to know the
names of other things." 81 The former episode illustrates a dyadic event and is
fully explained by the learning theory of social scientists such as B.F. Skinner,
while the latter event is the archetype of triadic relations and transcends all
behaviorist conceptions of stimulus and response. 82
Further evidence of the distinctive qualities of triadic behavior emerges
when one considers the relationship between the sign and the object. Percy
expands upon an example offered by Peirce: when a young child learns that an
object he sees is a balloon, the process that takes place is of a different order
from that involved when a dog salivates at the sound of a buzzer. Obviously,
the word "balloon" is only an arbitrary combination of letters or sounds chosen
to designate a class of things. But when his father tells the boy that the word
stands for the thing ("That's a balloon"), the sign and the object become
interpenetrated, joined by the copula "is": the thing is the word. The
interpenetration, however, is not a complete identity, for the actual object is, of
course, not the word "balloon." Yet the boy's knowledge of the object is
transformed by the naming of it.83 Likewise, the word-sign is something more
than a sound or marks on a page that "mean" the object, "[f]or it is precisely
the nature of the boy's breakthrough that he understands his father's utterance
78 5 PEiRCE, supra note 75, 484.
7 9 See 8 CHARLES S. PEcE, COLLECrED PAPERs OF CHARLES SANDERs PIERcE 361
(Arthur W. Burks ed., 1958). The terminology used herein is Peirce's. Other writers have
used any number of variations on the terms.
80 See supra text accompanying notes 69-73.
81 See PERCY, MESSAGE INTHEBOTTLE, supra note 16, at 164.
8 2 Id.
83 The thing itself is changed by being named. "It is precisely the nature of the boy's
breakthrough that the object he points to is understood by him as a member of a class of
inflated objects. A few minutes later he might well point to a blue sausage-shaped inflated
object and say 'Balloon.'" Id. at 43; see also id. at 168-69.
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as a particular instance of the word balloon."84 The sign "is not a concrete
thing at all but a general one, a law." 85 A dog has no such understanding of the
sound of a buzzer that it has been conditioned to "understand" as meaning the
arrival of food.
The sign and the object form but the two points at the base of the triadic
triangle. Their relationship to one another is wholly dependent upon the
existence of the third element at the apex, the human interpretant. 86 The
implications of the triadic nature of speech for our understanding of this third
element, the human who has the capacity to conjoin sign and object, are of
crucial importance. Helen Keller, when she gained the power to name things,
became a different sort of being, or at least a being with a new and
transcendent character. In an action of which the behaviorist's dog is incapable,
she coupled "water" with water. But it is imprecise to say "she" coupled the
sign and the object, for "she" existed before making the breakthrough to
language. The question then becomes, as Percy says, "[W]ho, what couples?
Who, what is the coupler?... All one can say for certain is that if two things
which are otherwise unconnected are coupled, there must be a coupler."87 The
coupler or, as Peirce called it, the interpretant, is that which allows human
beings to speak to and comprehend one another. If we can come to some
understanding of the qualities of this coupler, we will be that much further
toward understanding exactly what it is about speech that we might want to
protect.
2. The Results of Triadicity
The effects of the triadic capacity for language are several, and taken as a
whole they lead to the conclusion that the self, the aspect of people that makes
84 Id. at 43; see also id. at 171.
85 Id. at 43; see also Peirce, supra note 1, at 39-40.
86 The classical conception of signs, "the notion that a sign is essentially something that
standsfor another," leaves out entirely the component of the human mind, and the same is
true of other, more modem versions of semiology such as that of Ferdinand de Saussure.
COLAPIETRO, supra note 17, at 4-5.
Peirce's distinction between dyadic and triadic behavior has been noted before, but so
pervasive has been the influence of what might be called dyadic behaviorism that
Peirce's "triadic relation" has been recognized only to the degree that it can be set forth
as a congeries of dyads.... This is like saying that Einstein's special theory will be
accepted only to the degree that it can be verified by Newtonian mechanics.
PERcy, MESSAGE iN THE BOTTLE, supra note 16, at 162.
87 PERCY, MESSAGE IN THE BOTTLE, supra note 16, at 44.
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them human, is composed of nothing other than speech and thus that
restrictions on speech undermine the basis of the self. While establishing these
propositions will not dictate that the right of free speech be absolute, it will
suggest a way of understanding the value of speech that logically excludes
certain purposes-including the aims of social equalitarians-as illegitimate
bases for circumscribing the right. But before reaching any such determination,
we must first return to Peirce's description of the speech phenomenon and the
role of the human interpretant within it.
A normal child is born with the capacity for language use but does not
begin to exercise that capacity immediately, either in speaking or in
understanding the speech of others. Directly related to this, Peirce finds, is the
fact that in the period in human development preceding speech, the child lacks
self-consciousness. 88 The child is, however, aware of his own body; indeed,
his only relationship to the world is through "pure apperception," the direct
stimulation of his senses:
Only what [the body] touches has any actual and present feeling; only what it
faces has any actual color; only what is on its tongue has any actual taste.
No one questions that, when a sound is heard by a child, he thinks, not of
himself as hearing, but of the bell or other object as sounding."89
Yet he then becomes aware of others speaking, discovers the connection
between "the motions of the lips of bodies somewhat similar to [his own
body]" and his own lips, and so "begins to converse" almost instinctively. 90
This event is key, for the child begins to rely on the speech, the "testimony,"
of others to mediate between himself and the world. He finds that this
testimony is able to correct his errors of ignorance about the state of his
environment. 91 "Thus, he becomes aware of ignorance, and it is necessary to
suppose a self in which this ignorance can inhere. So testimony gives the first
dawning of self-consciousness." 92 And, Peirce might have added, this
correction of errors of perception begins a life-long inquiry into the nature of
the world.
88 Charles S. Peirce, Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man, J.
SPECULATIVEPHIL. (1868), reprinted in THEEssENTIALPEIRCE, supra note 1, at 11, 18-19.
89 Id. at 19.
90 1d.
91 "A child hears it said that the stove is hot. But it is not, he says; and,
indeed,... [the child's] body is not touching it, and only what that touches is hot or cold.
But he touches it, and finds the testimony confirmed in a striking way." Id. at 20.
92 Id.; see also COLAPIETRO, supra note 17, at 69-71; HOOKWAY, supra note 74, at
24-25; Antoni Gomila, Peirce and Self-Consciousness, in CHARLES S. PEIRCE AND THE
PHILOSOPHY oFSC'ENCE 318, 323-25 (Edward C. Moore ed., 1993).
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This initiation into language, which stretches out over months in ordinary
children, is the same one that, in Walker Percy's account, Helen Keller
underwent in a matter of hours. 93 Concomitant with the creation of self-
consciousness comes a new kind of consciousness of the external world.94
When a child begins to learn the names of things, she enters a new state of
being, or attains a new status. It is not that she simply desires out of idle
curiosity to know what everything is called; in an important sense, she needs to
know. 95 To a child who has made the breakthrough into language, the sign of a
thing is the only means through which it can be known.96 The result of this
new medium of speech intermediating between the person and the external
world is not to be seen as restricting, however; rather, instead of having her
knowledge limited to the environment that she perceives through her senses,
the sign-using child has a means through which to know, not merely an
environment, but the world.
The... organism has an environment.
The environment of an organism is those elements of the Cosmos which
affect the organism significantly . . . and to which the organism either is
genetically coded to respond or has learned to respond. There are many gaps in
an environment .... A honey bee takes account of the bee dance of another
bee indicating the direction and distance of a nectar source, but not of a grouse
dance.
The sign-user has a world.
The world is segmented and named by language. All perceived objects and
actions and qualities are named. Even the gaps are named.... The Cosmos is
accounted for willy-nilly, rightly or wrongly, mythically or scientifically, its
93 See supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text.94 See Gomila, supra note 92, at 325-30 (documenting support for this phenomenon
from the fields of developmental and social psychology).
95 PERCY, MESSAGE INTHEBoTTLE, supra note 16, at 255 & n.*.
96 Using the Helen Keller phenomenon as an example, Percy puts it this way:
To express it in modem semiotical language, the water is conceived through the vehicle
of the symbol. In Scholastic language, the symbol has the peculiar property of
containing within itself in alio esse, in another mode of existence, that which is
symbolized. Helen knows the water through and by means of the symbol.
Id. at 261 (footnote omitted).
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past, present, and future. All men in all cultures know what is under the earth,
what is above the earth, and where the Cosmos came from.97
The result of the sign-using mode of existence, of being a languaged
creature, is that all thought takes the form of signs.98 It now becomes possible
to say that thought, the part of us that couples objects and signs, is the self.
This in turn means that the self is composed of signs, that is, of speech. Hence
Peirce's statement that "my language is the sum total of myself; for the man is
the thought." 99 It is in thought-in language-that we know our world by
conjoining each object (i.e., everything that can be named) with its name.
Because one's self takes the form of thought and because thoughts take the
form of language, the conclusion must be that the self is made up of language.
Or, more properly, the self is a continuing flow of language, 100 for any thought
produced by a sign is itself a sign and gives rise to other thought-signs.' 0 l
This brings us to a point of particular importance. The self as a flow of
language is significant in that the flow is not random, but purposive.'0 2 Just as
9 7 PERCY, supra note 15, at 99; see also COLAPIETRO, supra note 17, at 71; PERCY,
MESSAGEINTHEBOTTLE, supra note 16, at 173.
98 See Peirce, supra note 88, at 23-24; see also Richard J. Bernstein, Action, Conduct,
and Self-Control, in PERSPECTIVES ONPEIRCE 66, 78 (Richard J. Bernstein ed., 1965).
9 9 Peirce, supra note 1, at 54.
100 Peirce ties many of these notions together in the following passage:
MIhere is no element whatever of man's consciousness which has not something
corresponding to it in the word; and the reason is obvious. It is that the word or sign
which man uses is the man himself. For, as the fact that every thought is a sign, taken
in conjunction with the fact that life is a train of thought, proves that man is a sign ....
Id.
101 See HOOKWAY, supra note 74, at 121 ("The three terms of the relation are the sign
itself, the object of the sign, and the interpretant, which is itself a sign and thus stands in the
same triadic relation to a further interpretant!").
Peirce himself allows the initial difficulty of the concept:
It is hard for man to understand this, because he persists in identifying himself with
his will, his power over the animal organism, with brute force. Now the organism is
only an instrument of thought. But the identity of a man consists in the consistency of
what he does and thinks, and consistency is the intellectual character of a thing; that is,
is its expressing something.
Peirce, supra note 1, at 54.
10 2 See PETER SKAGESTAD, THE RoAD OF INQUIRY: CHARLES PEIRCE'S PRAGMATIC
REALISM 130-31 (1981); see also Bernstein, supra note 98, at 79-82.
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the self arises out of the mediating power of speech in the face of a clash
between the perception and the experience of reality,10 3 the self, one's use of
language, is forever after driven by this power. The flow of language that is the
self is directed toward harmonizing one's thoughts or beliefs about the world
with the reality of it. When one's beliefs about reality are contradicted by one's
experience, the resulting surprise encourages a modification of the belief.104
Such surprises could be totally eliminated only by attaining perfect knowledge
of the external world, which Peirce calls "an ideal." 10 5 And if this is
unattainable in whole by any individual, the individual nonetheless acquires
pieces of such knowledge as she, her thinking, is changed, "determined," by
the very objects she uses signs to represent: "Not until our interpretants (our
ideas or intellectual habits) are fully attuned to their objects will we avoid
unexpected confrontations with a resistant reality. In this way, the real object
determines or shapes our mind, our reservoir of intellectual habits." 10 6
The self in this sense is best understood as a continuing inquiry for the
purpose of "the settlement of opinion" about reality,'10 7 and self-realization is
the process of carrying out this inquiry. 10 Peirce in no way suggests that any
103 See supra text accompanying note 92.
104 "The reality of things consists in their persistent forcing themselves upon our
recognition." 1 PEiRCE, supra note 75, 175; see also CJ. MisAK, TRUTH AND THE END OF
INQUIRY: A PEiRcEAN AccouNT oF TRUTH 47-49 (1991) ("Peirce characterizes the path of
inquiry as follows: belief-surprise-doubt-inquiry-belief.").
105 See Peirce, supra note 1, at 52 & n.*.
106 Nathan Houser, Introduction, in THE ESSENTIAL PEIRCE, supra note 1, at xx-xixxl.
John Smith puts the point this way:
Peirce. .. distinguishes between the object as thought or the immediate object and the
object that exerts itself in relation to other objects or the dynamical object. The
immediate object is dependent on the sign, but the dynamical object reverses the
relationship, because "[the dynamical object] is the Reality which by some means
contrives to determine the Sign to its Representation." The dynamical object is thus no
mere object of thought, but rather a source of effects; it is a dynamic center which has
constraining power over the sign that is to represent it.
John E. Smith, Community and Reality, in PERSPECEIVES ON PEMCE, supra note 98, at 92,
98 (quoting 4 PEiRct, supra note 75, 536).
107 Charles S. Peirce, The Fixation of Belief, POPULAR SCIENCE MONTHLY (1877),
reprinted in THE ESSENTIAL PEIRCE, supra note 1, at 109, 115; see also, e.g., HOOKWAY,
supra note 74, at 46-47.
108 The self can only realize itself by exerting control over itself; and it can only exert
control over itself by committing itself to ideals, since "self-control depends upon
comparison of what is done with an ideal admirable per se, without any ulterior
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self will be successful in attaining its "ideals"; people are prone to biases and
mistakes, and any one person's life is simply too short to correct them all. 109
But it is not only our "mistakes" that distinguish us one from another, for we
also exercise our wills through plans and purposes based upon our
understanding of reality at any given time, and by doing so we take a part in
determining the external reality of the world:
There are many ways to live in the world, and intellect does not constrain us to
a single path.... We can deliberately... change our intellectual habits-
which means that we can change our minds: and that means that we have some
measure of control over which of the many possible futures will be ours. 110
Each individual exercises her will based upon her understanding of the
consequences her actions will have in the external world; and by doing so, each
individual affects the external world as it exists for all other individuals. This
view sees the self as "a living force in the present and a flexible orientation
toward the future.... To be a self is to be in the process of becoming a self, a
process that is never complete." 11 This inquiry, taking place through the use
of language, enables learning and is the essence of human autonomy."l 2
Thus, self-realization through speech is achieved not merely by the
individual's indiscriminate or random use of language, but rather by her
reason." Peirce maintained that the realization of the self demanded a series of acts by
which the self surrenders itself to ever more inclusive ideals.
COLAPIETRO, supra note 17, at 95-96 (quoting an unpublished manuscript by Peirce).
109 See SKAGESTAD, supra note 102, at 126; Smith, supra note 106, at 105-06.
110 Houser, supra note 106, at xl; see also ROBERT J. LIFrON, THE PROTEAN SELF 5
(1993) ("If the self is a symbol of one's organism, the protean self-process is the continuous
psychic re-creation of that symbol. Although the process is by no means without confusion
and danger, it allows for an opening out of individual life, for a self of many possibilities.");
Gomila, supra note 92, at 320 (stating that one of "the central features of self-
consciousness" is "the capability of setting, assessing, and modifying one's own goals").
111 COLAPIETRO, supra note 17, at 76-77. Robert Lifton finds a similar strain of
thought in the writings of Ernst Cassirer and Susanne Langer and concludes that "[t]he
symbolizing self is developmentally sensitive to influences from early childhood but never
entirely 'determined' in outcome by any of them. The evolving self, in constantly re-
creating all such influences, traumatic or otherwise, becomes itself causative and always
prospective or forward moving." LIFrON, supra note 110, at 28-29; see also PERCY, supra
note 15, at 85-87 n.* (acknowledging Cassirer and Langer as allies of Peirce).
112 See COLAPIETRO, supra note 17, at 67-68, 89; see also HOOKWAY, supra note 74,
at 56-57; BERNARD WLLiAMS, Deciding to Believe, in PROBLEMS OF THE SELF 136, 136-39
(1973) (stating that "beliefs aim at truth" and that engaging in belief is a uniquely human
activity).
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intentional use of language in forming a life-plan based on beliefs resulting
from inquiry into external reality. Moreover, the external world includes other
selves, that also traffic in the triadic behavior of speech. The speech of other
selves may be the source of surprise and doubt, fueling one's own inquiry. 113
But the relationship of a self to other selves should not be understood as simply
antagonistic-although it surely can be that-any more than one's own self is at
odds with itself as it was in the past or as it will be in the future. The flow of
language that is the self takes place partially within the self as "a dialogue
between different phases of the ego."" 4 "[A man's] thoughts are what he is
'saying to himself,' that is, is saying to that other self that is just coming into
life in the flow of time." 115 But the nature of the self as made up of signs
creates the additional possibility of communication among a community of sign
users. Indeed, the very nature of the sign is that it requires both a sign giver
and a sign receiver. 116 For Peirce, "to be a self is to be a possible member of
some community .... The self is truly something unique and irreducible in
itself, but what it is in itself is only revealed or, more accurately, realized
through its relations with others. " ' 7 Thus, for Peirce, communication among
people was a process at least equally important to the realization of the self as
internal thought. 1 8 Being and becoming a self implicates speaking and
listening to one's self and others.
We have here, then, something like an empirical basis for grounding the
theories of the First Amendment scholars discussed earlier in this Part.119
Charles Peirce and those drawing out the implications of his work provide a
113 See supra note 104 and accompanying text. "Peirce insists that recalcitrant
experience is the primary motivation for doubt, but he often mentions other things that can
cause doubt, such as the contrary opinions of others ... ." MISAK, supra note 104, at 48
n.4; see also HOOKWAY, supra note 74, at 71 ("[I]n controlling our practice of
reasoning,... [a] further fixed element is provided by the opinions of others; we seek a
harmony between our own opinions and those of our fellows, which enable us jointly to
anticipate our joint experience and resolve disagreements.").
114 4 PEmcE, supra note 75, 6.
115 Charles S. Peirce, What Pragmatism Is, in MONIST (1905), quoted in COLAPIETRO,
supra note 17, at 91.
116 See PERCY, supra note 15, at 96.
117 COLAPIETRO, supra note 17, at 73-74 (citing 5 PERCE, supra note 75, 402 n.2).
118 See COLAPmTRO, supra note 17, at 79 ("For Peirce, then, the individual self is, in
its innermost being, not a private sphere but a communicative agent."); Smith, supra note
106, at 109 ("IThe individual himself is a microcosm of the community since his own
personal experience and thought involve him in a continual dialogue and dialectic of
ideas."). The significance of the exchange of meaning among people will be explored in
detail, infra, in Part IV.
119 See supra notes 45-53 and accompanying text.
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way of understanding speech not only as different from other activities but also
as the cornerstone of the human self. Without the capacity for speech, humans
would relate to their world and to each other as mere organisms in an
environment. Speech is special, different from human conduct of other sorts,
because it imbues not only all conduct but also the wrld of the languaged
creature with meaning. The contention that experiences apart from
communication contribute to self-realization in the same way as does speech 20
misses the essential point. The self-realization value to be derived from
nonspeech experience depends upon the speech capacity, for without that
capacity, activities and experiences such as travel and work would mean no
more to us than they do to animals.
Yet it is more than just the capacity for speech that makes us human; it is
the opportunity for the use of speech, both as speakers and listeners. What a
person is can be determined only by her thoughts, which necessarily take the
form of language-whether communicated to others or herself-the self flowing
inexorably through an endless stream of thought. And because no one knows
what turns that stream will take, the process of being human requires that all
possible thought, all possible language, be open to her, both as a speaker and
as a listener. In Vincent Colapietro's words:
A sign cut off from its future interpretants is a sign denied the possibility
of realizing its essence; that is, the possibility of being a sign. Such a sign is
the negation of seniosis; because it is impossible for it to realize its essence,
the most accurate description of it is in negative terms, just as the most apt
description of blindness is in privative terms. Thus, if the self is a sign and if it
is cut off from its future developments, it has been denied the possibility of
actualizing its essence; such a self is, in fact, the negation of selfliood. 121
As Peirce himself expressed the matter: "Were the ends of a person already
explicit [and antecedently fixed], there would be no room for development, for
growth, for life; and consequently there would be no personality." 122 Denying
the possibility of engaging in certain kinds of speech is to go some part of the
way toward fixing the human self in advance of its development and so
destroying it. Individual self-realization is a process and not a predetermined
result; it is, however, a process that moves toward a comprehensible point, the
exercise of the individual's will in a state of complete knowledge of external
reality. Although no individual self can expect to reach that point, it remains a
fixed mark by which the course of self-realization is set.
120 See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
121 COLAPmTo, supra note 17, at 77-78.
122 6 PEIRCE, supra note 75, 157, quoted in CoLAPIETRo, supra note 17, at 77
(editorial insertion in COLAPmTRO).
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If, as Stanley Fish insists, all defenders of the speech right are in fact
consequentialists promoting a necessarily "political" program beyond the
promotion of speech for speech's sake, 123 the program put forward here is
neither more nor less than preserving the conditions required for the fulfillment
of human potentiality. 124 This conclusion has serious implications for the social
equalitarian's proposals to limit speech. It is in order to understand those
implications, that the next part of the discussion focuses on the idea of equality.
III. SPEECH AND EQUALITY
The importance of the idea of equality in modem society is demonstrated
by the fact that hundreds of books on the subject have appeared in the last
twenty years, 125 and were the figure to include articles in scholarly journals it
might well number over one thousand. If the role played by notions of equality
has diminished in the governing legal doctrine since the demise of the Warren
Court, 126 it has nonetheless continued to thrive in the literature. 127 The
increasingly popular employment of the goal of social equality as a rationale for
circumscribing the Free Speech Clause is a particularly recent development. 128
Proponents of this position adamantly maintain that freedom of expression is
meaningless without, and therefore must be subordinated to, a prior
achievement of social equality. 129 Their defense of this proposition, though, is
almost entirely conclusory, framing the issue as a contest between two
provisions of the Constitution and throwing its rhetorical weight behind one,
the Equal Protection Clause. On its face, the argument-that speech should not
be immune from governmental regulation when it contributes to the disparities
in social conditions among people-taps into a set of admirable motives as well
as a powerful current of legal and political thought. Yet this superficial view
123 See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
124 Fish grudgingly acknowledges the possible viability of something like this view as
it is developed and tied to democratic theory in Part MI. See infra notes 238-239 and
accompanying text.
125 See WEsTEN, supra note 19, at 285.
126 See ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 103
(1970) ("[A] broadly-conceived egalitarianism was the main theme in the music to which
the Warren Court marched.").
127 Providing a rough index for the last dozen years or so, a search of the JLR
database (legal journals and law reviews) of WESTLAW in February 1995 revealed 807
documents published since 1981 whose titles include some form of the word "equal"; 247
of these titles use the phrase "equal protection" specifically.
128 See supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text.
129 See supra note 7.
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belies the deeper reality that promoting equality by restricting speech rights is
an internally contradictory project that damages rather than benefits its own
highest ideals.
A. Equality Theory
Equalitarian critics, implicitly or explicitly, advance two claims: first, that
the Equal Protection Clause calls for substantive social equality and second,
that it therefore commands (or at least allows) the suppression of hate speech as
a means of accomplishing this constitutionally prescribed end. 130 The second
claim derives from and so depends upon the first. Because the Constitution
insists on it, the argument runs, social equality serves as a compelling
justification for limiting rights under the First Amendment. 131 This
understanding of the equalitarian argument is brought out, not to question the
first claim of the ultimate goal of the Equal Protection Clause, t32 but instead to
examine the legitimacy of the second claim in light of the first. The question is,
however much social equality the Clause may demand, whether it can
legitimately be purchased by burdening the freedom of speech. This Part will
examine the logical basis of the Equal Protection Clause and conclude that
because of the nature of that basis, social equality cannot be achieved through
the censorship of speech.
Any statement of prescriptive equality-for instance, that a group of
persons should be treated equally in some sense-cannot stand on its own. If it
is to carry any logical force, it requires two premises: (1) a discrete normative
decision or rule dictating that the particular treatment in question, call it Y, is
13 0 See supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text.
131 See, e.g., MACKINNON, supra note 3, at 107 ("Equality is a 'compelling state
interest' that can already outweigh First Amendment rights in certain settings.").
132 Obviously, this is not to suggest that everyone agrees on the proper understanding
of the clause, far from it. See, e.g., WILLIAM E. NELSON, Tim FOURT.ENTH AMENDMENT
21 (1988) (stating that at the time of the framing of the Civil War Amendments, support for
the idea of equality came largely from "the very emptiness and vagueness of the
concept .... The use of more precise arguments in support of a political program might
tend to drive off potential support, but no one could be driven away by an argument for
equality, since everyone believed in it"); Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex,
Race, and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1003 (1986) (advocating an
antisubordination rather than an antidiscrimination approach to equal protection analysis);
Robin West, Equality Theory, Marital Rape, and the Promise of the Fourteenth Amendment,
42 FLA. L. REV. 45, 56-62 (1990) (sketching three different current conceptions of the
Equal Protection Clause); see also WFSTEN, supra note 19, at 75-79 (arguing that the
axiom "All persons are equal before the law" has at least seven different, sometimes
contradictory potential meanings).
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to be determined by a person's possession of some characteristic, X; and (2) a
valid factual statement of descriptive equality to the effect that all of the persons
in the group are equal in their possession of the characteristic X. 133 The
characteristic X, in other words, is the subject of the actual equality as well as
the determining factor (through the application of the rule that the treatment Y
depends upon X) for the prescriptive equality. To illustrate these rather abstract
formulations, imagine, for example, that you run a produce stand selling
melons of many different kinds and sizes. A conceivable statement of
prescriptive equality might be that you should sell each melon for the same
price. But this prescription cannot be conjured ex nihilo. Following it would
not make sense unless: (1) you have decided that the price given to each melon
(Y) should be determined solely by a certain quality (X), say weight; and (2) all
of the melons are alike in weight.
Normative Rule: (1) The price of a melon will be
determined by its weight;
Descriptive Equality: (2) All of the melons have equal weights;
Prescriptive Equality: (3) Therefore, all of the melons should have the
same price.
If either (1) or (2) do not obtain-either you recognize different or additional
factors (quality, wholesale costs) that should bear on the price you charge for
any given melon, or the melons in fact have various weights-then the
prescription is logically baseless.
Such an analysis can illuminate the Equal Protection Clause. The Clause is
itself a statement of prescriptive equality: it specifies a group (persons) and
133 Descriptive equality is an "is," not an "ought." One cannot infer that, because
people are equal, they ought to be treated equally. To make the move from descriptive
to prescriptive equality, one must do what is always necessary in moving from an "is"
to an "ought": one must engage in moral or legal reasoning toward the formulation of a
norm, a proposition that persons of a certain description deserve treatment of a certain
kind. Without such norms, prescriptive equality is impossible because there is no
standard by which people can be compared with respect to what they owe or deserve.
WESTEN, supra note 19, at 123; see also D.A. Lloyd Thomas, Equality Within the Limits of
Reason Alone, 88 MND 538, 538 (1979); Waldron, supra note 20, at 1353-55; Bernard
Williams, The Idea of Equality, in PHILOSOPHY, PoLrrics AND SOcmTY 110, 112 (Peter
Laslett & W.G. Runciman eds., 1972) ("[P]olitical proposals have their force because they
are regarded not as gratuitously egalitarian, aiming at equal treatment for reasons... of
simplicity or tidiness, but as affirming an equality which is believed in some sense already
to exist, and to be obscured or neglected by actual social arrangements.").
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instructs that a certain treatment (protection of the laws) be given to them
equally. The Clause is undoubtedly ambiguous in the reach of its prescription,
leading to myriad battles such as those over various forms of affirmative action
that continue to be fought in the arenas of politics and the courts. 134 This
ambiguity need not concern us here, however, since for present purposes it will
do to accept as broad a construction of the substantive results required by the
Clause as social equalitarian critics care to propose. But one other uncertainty
related to the Clause remains and must be put to rest before the question of
speech restrictions in the name of social equality can be resolved. The problem
can be illustrated by laying out the syllogistic structure underlying the Clause:
Normative Rule: (1) The level of protection of the laws a person
receives will be determined by X;
Descriptive Equality: (2) All persons are equal in respect of X;
Prescriptive Equality: (3) Therefore, all persons have a right to equal
protection of the laws.
We know what the prescribed treatment is (protection of the laws), and we
know the group to whom it is to apply and who must thus all be equal in virtue
of some characteristic (persons). The uncertainty is this: What exactly is this
characteristic that, as a descriptive matter, all persons possess and that, as a
normative matter, has been decided to determine the level of "protection of the
laws" a person deserves? The X in the logical formula underlying the Equal
Protection Clause is unknown.
The constitutional status of the clause forecloses the possibility that we may
freely reject it even should it turn out to lack-because of the nonexistence of
X-the two premises requisite for a logically founded prescriptive equality
statement, although such a finding would pose serious problems for its
understanding and application. 135 But even if we could in some way be assured
merely of the existence of X and so of the solidity of the underlying premises
of the clause's prescription, it is nonetheless important also to know the identity
of X, for that will suggest constraints on the methods by which the prescription
of the Equal Protection Clause may be fulfilled. The next section will be
devoted to three tasks: (1) explaining the requisites of a characteristic of
13 4 See NELsoN, supra note 132, at 138-47.
135 These problems would be similar to those perceived by Schauer to exist within the
First Amendment, since in Schauer's view the Free Speech Clause requires a protection of
speech that is not compelled by any rational reason. See supra note 55 and accompanying
text.
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descriptive human equality, (2) identifying the speech capacity-and therefore
the possession of a human self-as the only significant characteristic that
satisfies those requirements, and (3) confirming that, as the basis of human
equality, speech is also the determining factor in the independent normative
rule for the distribution of protection of the laws.
B. Identifying the Basis of Hwnan Equality
1. The Nature of the Inquiry
Of course, the Equal Protection Clause is not unique in presenting the idea
that all people are equal and so should be treated equally. The philosophy of
the Enlightenment along these lines, as set out in the Declaration of
Independence136 and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the
Citizen,137 is perhaps the most familiar modem recapitulation of the thesis.138
Yet these documents, like the Equal Protection Clause, merely imply the
existence of a descriptive equality, declaring it to be "self-evident," without
naming its source. It may be that they do not mean to suggest any actual
equality exists among all people, but only that human equality is to be taken as
an "ethical judgment" 139 consented to by the governed. 140 To say that all
human beings are equal in and only in the respect that they are all human is,
however, to make a claim that is either manifestly inaccurate (given the evident
differences among people "of stature, physique, intellect, virtue, merit, and
desert"' 41) or useless for purposes of knowing how the descriptive equality
should affect the treatment people are given, short of treating all people the
136 "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they
are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights .... DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776), reptinted in THE IDEA OF EQUALrrY 147, 147 (George
L. Abernethy ed., 1959).
137 "Men are born, and always continue, free and equal in respect of their rights."
DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND OF THE CrrizEN art. 1 (1789), reprinted in THE
IDEA OF EQUALrrY, supra note 136, at 156.
13 8 See Brian Barry, Equality, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ETHICs 322, 323 (Lawrence C.
Becker & Charlotte B. Becker eds., 1992); see also Mark G. Yudof, Equal Protection,
Cas Legilation, and Sex Discrimination: One Small Cheer for Mr. Herbert Spencer's
Social Statics, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1366, 1368 (1990) (reviewing WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1988)).
139 See R.H. TAWNEY, EQUALITY 34, 40-42 (1931) ("[Tihe word 'Equality'... may
assert that while [men] differ profoundly as individuals... they are equally entitled as
human beings to consideration and respect .... ").
140 See Yudof, supra note 138, at 1369.
141 Benn, supra note 23, at 61.
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same way in all circumstances. 142 If people are to be considered descriptively
equal for some purposes and unequal for others, depending upon the treatment
in question, it then becomes crucial either, on the one hand, to know the
content of the underlying basis of human equality-so as to know whether it is
implicated in the treatment in question-or, on the other hand, to be told by
some authoritative source exactly which kinds of treatment are to be
administered to all people equally.
The Equal Protection Clause generally exemplifies the second option (as do
the Constitution's various grants of individual rights), for it tells us that all
persons are to receive equal protection of the laws, though it does so without
telling us why. But because the treatment that it specifies is left in vague terms,
we remain at a loss to know precisely when the clause is and is not implicated
by any given governmental act.' 43 If we could avail ourselves of the first
option by discovering the substantive content of human equality, two related
results should follow. First, we would have a logical means, independent of the
positivistic dictates of the Clause, for reasoning out the legitimate ends of equal
protection. (This would be no panacea for interpreting the Clause, however, for
it would still be necessary to decide whether a specific state action is or should
be dependent upon the characteristic that constitutes human equality.) Second,
and relevant for our purposes, identifying the descriptive equality upon which
the prescription of the Clause is based would allow us to declare logically
improper any means used to enforce the prescription that conflict with the two
premises that the Clause needs to support it.
142 It cannot be the aim of this maxim [of equal humanity] that all men should be
treated alike in all circumstances, or even that they should be treated alike as much as
possible. Granted that, however, there is no obvious stopping point before the
interpretation which makes the maxim claim only... that for every difference in the
way men are treated, some... principle of differentiation must be given.... It would
be in accordance with this principle, for example to treat black men differently from
others just because they were black ....
Williams, supra note 133, at 111; see also J. ROLAND PENNOCK, DEMOcRATIc POLrrIcAL
THEORY 40 (1979) ("The question of... what constitutes a relevant basis for treating some
people differently from others... is enormously complicated and controversial.");
Thomas, supra note 133, at 540-41.
William Nelson identifies this precise problem as lying at the root of understanding the
equal protection component of the Fourteenth Amendment. See NELSON, supra note 132, at
138-39 ("T rhe congressional proponents of the Fourteenth Amendment were always able
to specify whether a particular classification was reasonable or arbitrary. But they were
persistently unable to elaborate how their conclusions were derived from or compelled by
their more general theory.").
143 See supra notes 132, 142 and accompanying text.
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There have been many attempts to define the content of human equality. 144
Perhaps the original conception of an equality so fundamental that it embraces
all people resides in the Christian doctrine of equality of people as soul bearers
before God.' 45 If we all shared the same faith, then, we might agree that the
way in which all people are substantively alike is in their possession of a soul.
However, it is not merely the absence of a common religious belief that renders
this solution inadequate. 146 Indeed, the pursuit of a factual basis for human
equality has supplied a number of secular substitutes for the soul. The most
influential version has been that depicted by Kant, the equal possession by all
of a rational nature, requiring that people be treated as ends in themselves
rather than as means. 147 Kant's vision of the individual as a moral agent with
free will, however, like the Christian conception of the soul, is a transcendental
one, since it is not based on any empirical properties of persons.148 As such,
Kantian rational nature is for our purposes distinguishable from the Christian
soul only by being a secular version of the same thing. 149 The same holds true
for other candidates for the nature of human equality, such as "individual
human worth" or "dignity of the individual," insofar as they simply apply a
different label to some similarly ethereal quality. 150 And none of these can be
144 For the Stoics, the descriptive standard was the possession of reason; for the
Epicureans, it was the capacity to experience happiness; for Christians, it was
knowledge of good and evil; for Hobbes, it was the capacity to kill and be killed; for
Kant, it was rationality; for John Raws, it is "moral personality," a capacity to make
plans and give justice; and for others, it is the state of being "conscious beings who
necessarily have intentions and purposes and see what they are doing in a certain light."
WESTEN, supra note 19, at 122-23 (quoting Williams, supra note 133, at 117).
145 See, e.g., Sanford A. Lakoff, Chrisianity and Equality, in 9 [EQUALrryI NOMOS,
supra note 23, at 115; Thomas, supra note 133, at 539; Williams, supra note 133, at 116.
146 See Lakoff, supra note 145, at 119 ("Che Pauline Christian conception of
equality was never a very clear guide to thought or action.").
14 7 See IMMANUEL KANT, THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE METAPHYSICS OF
MORALs (1785), excerpted in THE IDEA OF EQUALITY, supra note 136, at 153, 153-55; see
also Amy GurrMAN, LIBERAL EQUALITY 33-41 (1980) (outlining Kant's theory of the
rationality and moral capacity of human beings).
148 See Williams, supra note 133, at 116 ("[I]n the Kantian view, the capacity to be a
rational agent is not itself an empirical capacity at all.").
149 The ground of the respect owed to each man thus emerges in the Kantian theory as
a kind of secular analogue of the Christian conception of the respect owed to all men as
equally children of God. Though secular, it is equally metaphysical: in neither case is it
anything empirical aout men that constitutes the ground of equal respect.
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of any more use in specifying the descriptive ground of human equality than
conclusory, ad hoc assertions to the effect that "all people are equal," such as
those considered above. 151 For unless an empirical basis of human equality can
be found, it will be impossible to know when people must be treated equally
and when they may be legitimately distinguished from one another. 152
2. Speech and the Basis of Hwnan Equality
Recognizing the fatal limitation of nonempirical foundations for
prescriptions of equality, philosophers have proposed a number of human
characteristics in the hopes of finding one free from that weakness. In point of
fact, they have proposed one characteristic, although each has given it a
different name. D. A. Lloyd Thomas admits that Kant's "rational nature" is a
transcendent rather than empirical quality; however, he suggests that it may be
possible to "provide a rough indication of a non-transcendental counterpat." 153
All human beings might be said to possess a "practical rationality," a power
that encompasses
the capacity to envisage ends, plans of action, and projects; and to adopt
appropriate means to secure them. The adoption of appropriate means is to be
understood as involving not only the more intellectually orientated activities of
making one's plans consistent and discovering the appropriate means to secure
them, but also a capacity of the 'will' to make one's actions conform to such
plans. 154
As Thomas points out, this "practical rationality" is distinctly similar to John
Rawls's notion of people as creatures capable of planning their lives. 155 Stanley
Benn likewise finds rationality central:
150 Wlf there are no ascertainable properties of people upon which their possession of
"human worth" depends; or alternately, if there is nothing a person can do, or that can
happen to him such that he can lose the properties upon which "human worth" is based,
then we have on our hands something logically rather like the soul, re-packaged for
secular consumption.
Thomas, supra note 133, at 541.
151 See supra notes 136-40 and accompanying text.
152 In other words, we must be able to determine when external circumstances
overcome human equality to justify differential treatment. See supra notes 142, 150.
153 Thomas, supra note 133, at 543.
154 Id.
155 See id.; see also JOHN RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE § 77 (1971). Other
contemporary legal and political philosophers espouse positions along these lines. See, e.g.,
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[E]ach of us sees in other men the image of himself. So he recognizes in them
what he knows in his own experience, the potentialities for moral freedom, for
making responsible choices among ways of life open to him, for striving, no
matter how mistakenly and unsuccessfully, to make of himself something
worthy of his own respect. 156
Bernard Williams reaches a similar conclusion, stating that people should be
treated, in Kant's phrase, not as means but as ends, equal in themselves, since
"men are conscious beings who necessarily have intentions and purposes and
see what they are doing in a certain light." 157 Finally, Vinit Haksar effectively
lumps all of these suggestions together when he says that "all human beings
unlike animals have the potential to acquire certain capacities such as the ability
to use language, self-consciousness, autonomy, the ability to form life-plans
and to carry them out with zest, capacity for moral sentiments, capacity for
sense of justice." 158
These various expressions of the actual equality among persons, while
stressing different specifics, seem clearly to be getting at the same thing. If they
continue to use phrases such as "moral capacity" and "moral freedom,"
phrases with some whiff of transcendentalism about them, it is perhaps because
they have not yet gotten to the essence of the thing itself, but continue to circle
around it, identifying its ancillary properties even as they close in on it. The
discussion of Part II now enables this conclusion: The thing that allows humans
to plan, to act autonomously with intentions and purposes, to be self-conscious,
to exercise "practical rationality" is the existence of the human self as
constituted by the capacity for and freedom to engage in the triadic behavior of
speech. This realization was what Walker Percy, in the midst of his own search
for a theory of the human creature, likened to the discovery of "pure
uranium... smelted from thousands of tons of ore-bearing rock."159
The awakening of self-consciousness in children, like that in Helen
Keller-like that in the species homo sapiens itself-arrives with the creature's
entry into the world of language. 160 This birth of the self through speech
begins a continuous process that makes of the human environment a world, and
of the human brain a mind. 161 It is the hearing and the utterance of speech that
ROBERT NoziCK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 49-50 (1974); JOSEPH RAZ, THm MoRALrry
oF FREEDOM 204 (1986).
156 Benn, supra note 23, at 70.
157 Williams, supra note 133, at 117.
158 VINrr HAKSAR, EQUALTY, LBERTY, AND PERPECrIONISM 66-67 (1979) (enlisting
the theories of Alen Gewirth and William James).
159 PERCY, MESSAGE INTHEBOrrLE, supra note 16, at 38.
160 See supra notes 71-72, 88-93 and accompanying text.
161 See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
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create social relationships by letting us, in Benn's words, recognize "in other
men the image of [ourselves]." 162 Finally, the capacity for and the opportunity
to engage in speech create the human ability to reason and learn and thus to
function as autonomous beings in planning their futures. 163 The triadic nature
of speech and its creation of the self are thus at the core of all the
characteristics that have been advanced as the basis of descriptive human
equality. For each of these characteristics exists only by virtue of the speech
capacity and they are empirically demonstrable only by reference to that
capacity.
In order to say with confidence that a given characteristic constitutes the
way in which all humans are descriptively equal, it has been suggested, it must
be possible to demonstrate empirically that all people possess the characteristic,
that they possess it to an equal degree, and that they alone among species
possess it.164 That all people have the power for language is, in one way, the
least controversial of the three propositions, for it is open to confirmation by
anyone who doubts it. 165 As Percy has said: "Language is unlike birds' flight.
Some birds are superb flyers; others are lousy. But every normal human has
162 See supra notes 113-18 and accompanying text. Compare Bean's image, see supra
text accompanying note 156, with one that Peirce himself uses:
The recognition by one person of another's personality takes place by means to some
extent identical with the means by which he is conscious of his own personality. The
idea of the second personality, which is as much to say that second personality itself,
enters within the field of direct consciousness of the first person, and is as immediately
perceived as his ego, though less strongly. At the same time, the opposition between the
two persons is perceived, so that the externality of the second is recognized.
6 P CE, supra note 75, 160.
163 See supra notes 102-12 and accompanying text.
164 See Thomas, supra note 133, at 540, 542, 547; see also HAKSAR, supra note 158,
at 67-71.
165 The capacity for language may be evidenced in human anatomical features:
[Ihere are recently evolved structures in the human brain which have to do with
speech and understanding speech, such as the inferior parietal lobule which receives
information from the "primary sensory projection systems"; that is, the cerebral cortex
which registers seeing and feeling water and hearing the word "water." These are
described as "association areas."
PERCY, supra note 60, at 284 (quoting neuro-anatomist Norman Geschwind). But according
to Percy, "what is important about the triadic event is that it is there for all to see, that in
fact it occurs hundreds of times daily-whenever we talk or listen to somebody talking-that
its elements are open to inspection to everyone." Id. at 286.
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the capacity for uttering and understanding an infinite number of sentences in
his language, no matter what the language is." 166 This statement, by the way,
also asserts the validity of the second proposition, that all humans have an
equal capacity for speech; its truth is implicit in the fact that, in linguistic
terms, "there is no such thing as a primitive language." 167 In this sense, it is
not the individual's skill or facility in making use of her power of speech, but
possession of the power itself. 168 The third proposition, that only the human
species possesses the capacity for language, requires a word of explanation.
The explorations of both Charles Peirce and Walker Percy do indeed
indicate that speech is peculiar to human beings. 169 Insofar as this fact may be
doubted, however, a finding to the contrary would not weaken the present case.
This is so because the only reason for including this criterion in the
determination of whether the speech capacity constitutes a descriptive equality
among humans is to exclude any other animal from the prescriptive results of
the empirical equality statement, 170 and the argument here requires no such
exclusion. Since those who frame prescriptions of equality usually assume
humans to be importantly different from animals, the prescriptions-whether
philosophical, moral, or legal (as in the Equal Protection Clause's limited
applicability to "persons")-tend to take it as a given that this is the case.
Consequently, philosophers who seek to explain the supporting logic of the
166 Id. at 119.
167 Id. (citing Edward Sapir, Language, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
(Edwin R.A. Seligman ed., 1937)).
168 It might be objected that some people are not, to use Percy's own word, "normal"
in that they, through a congenital defect or the like, actually lack the mental ability to
engage in triadic behavior. While some have thought it unnecessary to deal with the
aberrational cases in a discussion of general human equality, see, e.g., RAWLS, supra note
155, § 77, at 510; Williams, supra note 133, at 118, such evasion is not necessary. Of
course, we do accept differential treatment for these individuals where their handicaps are
implicated. See Benn, supra note 123, at 70. For a thorough argument as to why this does
not eliminate the basis of the descriptive human equality, see HKSAR, supra note 158, at
71-79; see also Barry, supra note 138, at 325-26.
169 See supra notes 77-85 and accompanying text; see also PERCY, supra note 60, at
118-19 (stating that the neuro-anatomical structures that have been identified as possible
centers of speech in the human brain are "not present or else extremely rudimentary in even
the highest apes. Moreover, recent experiments have shown that if one destroys this cortical
region in other primates, it has no effect on vocalization, which is mediated not by a cortical
but rather by the limbic system").
170 See Thomas, supra note 133, at 542 (stating that unless the basis of equality
excludes other species it would "hold out little hope of justifying some of the major moral
distinctions we draw").
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prescriptions include this restriction in their explanations.171 But if it were
proved that the speech capacity inheres in other animals, that finding would not
change the treatment to be accorded to people; it would only suggest that
whatever other animals have the same power should be eligible for the same
treatment.1 72
3. Speech, the Self, and Protection of the Laws
Having contented ourselves that the speech capacity fulfills the criteria of a
descriptive basis of equality, we must still establish that it is the descriptive
basis that underlies the prescriptive equality of the Equal Protection Clause.
That is, in order for the human self, which results from speech, to be accepted
as the key to the dictates of the Clause, not only must it describe a way in
which all people actually are equal, it must also be the characteristic-as a
result of a normative decision made independently of equality concerns-upon
which the "protection of the laws" depends. 173 After all, human beings are
equal (and even different from animals) in other ways not obviously connected
to the power of language; they walk erect, for instance, and have opposable
thumbs. And it is not merely the comparative right'74 of equal protection that
depends upon the relevant descriptive human equality; noncomparative
fundamental rights similarly belong to all people, notwithstanding the
differences among them. 175 Yet few would argue, it seems safe to say, that an
171 See, e.g., RAWLS, supra note 155, § 77, at 504, 512.
172 "If we were able to establish communication with another species-dolphins, for
instance-and found that they too were engaged in this 'characteristically human enterprise,'
I think we should find ourselves thinking of them as a fishy variety of human being, making
much the same claim on our consideration." Benn, supra note 23, at 71 n.9; see also
PERcy, supra note 15, at 95 ("The present argument does not require that triadic behavior
be unique in man. Perhaps it is not. Semiotics proposes only that where triadic behavior
occurs, certain new properties and relationships also come into existence.").
173 See supra note 133 and accompanying text; see also Thomas, supra note 133, at
544 ("There must be some reasonable chance of showing that the property bears on the
forms of equal treatment that it is hoped, eventually, to defend.").
174 Jeremy Waldron explains the distinction between comparative and noncomparative
rights as follows: "A noncomparative standard is one that entitles each person to some good
or liberty by virtue of possessing some feature or characteristic .... With comparative
principles, by contrast, what matters for a given person is the relation between what she gets
and what others get." Waldron, supra note 20, at 1356; see also Joel Feinberg,
Noncomparative Justice, 83 PHIL. REv. 297 (1974).
175 See RONALD DwoRKN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 273-74 (1977) ("[I]ndividual
rights to distinct liberties must be recognized only when the fundamental right to treatment
as an equal can be shown to require these rights.").
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upright gait or the opposition of thumb and fingers justifies the rights bestowed
upon persons by the Constitution.
For those who have considered the question, fundamental rights such as
protection of the laws are indeed granted on the basis of that thing-
alternatively called practical rationality, autonomy, moral agency, and so
forth-which we have more accurately identified as the speech capacity that is
the self. 176 The thrust of Part II above is that because speech is the essence of
the human self, the right of free speech stands preeminent among fundamental
rights in that it alone protects the very source and content of the self. Many
other constitutional rights may be viewed in this context as playing a
supporting part to that of the First Amendment; if their purpose lies at some
remove from the actual source and substance of the self, they nonetheless
safeguard the conditions most conducive to its flourishing. While the Supreme
Court has recognized the connection between speech and the self only
incompletely and inconsistently, 177 Laurence Tribe persuasively argues that the
Court has generally understood fundamental rights as necessary to preserve the
integrity of the self.178 This understanding has been arrived at in piecemeal
fashion, however. 179 For just as philosophers have struggled to give a name to
the constitutive characteristic that forms the foundation of human equality, the
parallel search within the law has also grasped at "[w]ords like 'personhood,'
176 See, e.g., Bena, supra note 23, at 65 (stating that "catalogs of natural and human
rights are attempts to formulate" the ramifications of the descriptive equality of persons);
see also Williams, supra note 133, at 112 (arguing that moral claims arise from common
humanity).
177 See supra notes 37-44 and accompanying text.
178 Marshalling a wide range of the Court's cases as well as legal scholarship, Tribe
explicates a number of rights created by or derived from the Constitution. These include,
under his own taxonomy, the liberty of conscience (comprising First Amendment freedoms
of religion and speech), freedom of inquiry in the educational setting, freedom from
governmental control of the consciousness, control over bodily integrity, and freedom to
make a life plan. LAuRENCE H. TRiNE, AMERICAN CONSTrruTIONAL LAw §§ 15-5 through
15-11 (2d ed. 1988).
179 To make sense for constitutional law out of the smorgasbord of philosophy,
sociology, religion and history upon which our understanding of humanity subsists, we
must turn from absolute propositions and dichotomies so as to place each allegedly
protected act, and each alleged illegitimate intrusion, in a social context related to the
Constitution's text and structure.
... But, after all is said and done, there is no escape, if the essence of personality
is to be protected, from the attempt to define.., wherein that essence lies.
Id. § 15-2, at 1306-07.
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'autonomy,' 'identity,' and 'dignity.'" 180 Given their proper understanding,
however, the fundamental rights of the Constitution have but "a single aim:
preservation of 'those attributes of an individual which are irreducible in his
selfhood. ' " 181 On our understanding that the human self is in fact composed
entirely of speech,' 82 we may conclude that the speech capacity is both the
ground of descriptive human equality and the determining factor in the
allocation of fundamental rights, including "protection of the laws."
C. Social Equality and Speech
All that remains for this part of the argument is to make explicit what
should by now be nearly self-evident: social equality cannot be advanced
18 0 Id. § 15-2, at 1304. The difficulties have been just as great in the legal as in the
philosophical setting:
Human beings are of course the intended beneficiaries of our constitutional
scheme.... [Y]et [the Constitution] contains no discussion of the right to be a human
being; no definition of a person; and, indeed, no express provisions guaranteeing to
persons the right to carry on their lives protected from the "vicissitudes of the political
process" by a zone of privacy or a right of personhood. Nor, apart from the obviously
incomplete listing in the Bill of Rights, does the document enumerate those aspects of
self which must be preserved and allowed to flourish if we are to promote the fullest
development of human faculties ....
1d. § 15-3, at 1308 (citations omitted).
181 Id. § 15-1, at 1304 (quoting Freund, 52d ALI Ann. Mtg. 42-43 (1975)); see also
supra note 175.
Others have come to similar conclusions, expanding the conventional notion of privacy
rights to show that many fundamental rights are designed to protect the self. See, e.g.,
PENNOCK, supra note 142, at 84. Stanley Benn makes the point in terms that clearly echo
Peirce's conception of the individual self's use of language, see supra notes 102-112:
I am suggesting that a general principle of privacy might be grounded on the more
general principle of respect for persons. By a person I understand a subject with a
consciousness of himself as an agent, one who is capable of having projects, and
assessing his achievements in relation to them. To conceive someone as a person is to
see him as actually or potentially a chooser, as one attempting to steer his own course
through the world, adjusting his behavior as his apperception of the world changes, and
correcting course as he perceives his errors.
Stanley I. Berm, Privacy, Freedom, and Respect for Persons, 13 [PRIVACY] NOMOS 1, 8-9
(I. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1971).
182 See supra notes 98-101 and accompanying text.
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through infringements on speech. The preceding exposition of the Equal
Protection Clause's prescriptive equality command permits us to map out fully
its constituent syllogistic steps as follows:18 3
Normative Rule: (1) Protection of the laws is to be granted to
persons based on the possession of a self;
Descriptive Equality: (2) All persons possess selves equally;
Prescriptive Equality: (3) All persons have a right to equal
protection of the laws.
The self, as Peirce's explanation of the phenomenon demonstrates, is composed
of the flow of speech, both internal and external, through the mind in a
continuous inquiry aimed at harmonizing one's understanding of the world with
its external reality.184 Thus the self is constituted neither by any particular
content in speech nor by any particular kind of speech. Rather, it is constituted
by the capacity for speech and the freedom to make use of that capacity,
"freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think,"18 5 without regard to
where the process may lead, for it is not the destination, but the process that
gives life to the individual self.186
Comprehending the relationships between the Equal Protection Clause and
the self, on the one hand, and between the self and the freedom of speech, on
the other hand, makes apparent the absurdity of trying to fulfill the prescription
of the Clause by circumscribing speech rights. The only rationale for providing
protection of the laws to people in the first instance is the normative decision
that people are worthy of such protection because of their possession of selves.
The self, in other words, has been independently judged to be a valuable thing,
meriting various measures (including protection of the laws) designed to ensure
its preservation. Reducing the freedom of speech-which necessarily means
diminishing the potentiality of the human self-as a means of assuring that the
protection of the laws is bestowed equally is to attempt to satisfy a derivative
183 See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
184 See supra notes 98-108 and accompanying text.
185 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927) (Brandeis, J., joined by Holmes,
J., concurring); see also supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
186 See supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text; see also David A.J. Richards,
Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Theory of the First Amendment, 123 U.
PA. L. REV. 45, 62 (1974) (stating that "[fireedom of expression permits and encourages"
the use of "the central human capacity to create and express symbolic systems .... In so
doing, it nurtures and sustains the self-respect of the mature person.").
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principle by violating its constitutive principle.187 The attempt, in short, is
logically doomed to destroy the very thing it proposes to rescue. 188
It may be objected that by setting up the right of free speech as the prime
protector of the self and, in turn, the self as the entity to which fundamental
rights are dedicated, the present argument cannot but maintain that the First
Amendment is, after all, an absolute. Otherwise (the criticism would
presumably continue), any compromise of the absolutist position would reveal
that, regardless of its connection to the self, the speech right is finally a
contingent thing that should and indeed does give way when sufficiently
weighty considerations are balanced against it. The objection is mistaken,
however. The point here is not that the speech right as guardian of the human
self is unassailable; the point is rather that the right is unassailable when the
assault is made for the purpose ofpromoting the integrity of the self.
This is not equivalent to First Amendment absolutism. A proposed limit on
speech might well be valid if it were based, not on a prescription derived from
the value of the self, but instead on some distinct normative principle. In such a
case, the contest would be between two independent values, and the decision
could conceivably go either way. 189 But where restrictions on speech purport
to foster a goal, the value of which itself derives from benefits of free speech,
such restrictions will prove self-defeating in the deepest sense possible.
IV. THE SELF AND DEMOCRACY
A. Conflicting Theories of the Self
The discussion to this point suggests a theory of the individual self that
explains the place it holds in our constitutional scheme of personal rights. In
this scheme, the right of free speech is primary in that it protects the essence of
187 See RAWLS, supra note 155, § 77, at 511 ("The priority of [the fundamental right
to equal respect] over [a principle of equal distribution of goods] enables us to avoid
balancing these conceptions of equality in an ad hoe manner.... ."); Dworkin, Liberalism,
supra note 23, at 116-17 n.1, 125-26 (explaining the relationship between constitutive and
derivative principles).
188 See Vlastos, supra note 20, at 62-67 (arguing that under principles of equalitarian
justice, "just distribution" necessarily means the equal distribution of benefits "at the highest
obtainable level"); cf. RAWLS, supra note 155, § 11, at 60, § 46 at 302 (expounding the
"difference principle").
189 See DwoRinc, TAKING RIGHTs SERIOUSLY, supra note 175, at 277-78 ("The
argument for any given specific liberty may... be entirely independent of the argument
for any other, and there is no antecedent inconsistency or even implausibility in contending
for one while disputing the other.").
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the self, whereas other fundamental rights create a space that insulates that
essence from incursions by the state. 190 Further, since the self is literally
composed of speech and since the justification for social equality relies upon
the value of the self, social equality cannot logically be sought through a
diminution of the speech right. An acceptance of this much would put paid to
the idea of outlawing certain speech on the ground that it contributes to the
subordination of oppressed groups.
Yet the foregoing remains open to a potentially devastating criticism: even
granting that the self is in fact the necessary foundation underlying the demand
for social equality, the claim that the human self is composed of speech might
be considered seriously incomplete because it ignores the threats to the self that
also come in the form of speech. In other words, one might accept the
syllogism arrived at in Part III, identifying the self as both the basis of
descriptive human equality and the determining factor in the distribution of
"protection of the laws," yet deny the identity asserted in Part 11 between the
self and freedom of speech. The arguments of social equalitarian critics imply
that hate speech, whatever dubious benefits it may have for the individual self
who engages in it, unquestionably injures the selves of its targets. Thus, the
self cannot be understood as intact merely by virtue of the speech capacity and
the freedom to exercise it; it requires also to be free from the speech of other
selves that would degrade it. The validity of this objection is best explored by
focusing on the two sides of this aspect of the argument.
1. Self-Realization Through Free Speech
The explanation of the self outlined above in Part II contains an implicit
rejection of the contention that speech expressing offensive ideas can be
understood as threatening to the self. The self, an entity made up of nothing but
language, becomes itself by means of an ongoing inquiry conducted through
the medium of language, an inquiry in which the self both speaks and listens.
The end of the inquiry is to reconcile the self's perceptions with the reality of
the world and so be enabled to choose its future and its life plan. 191 The
forward-looking nature of the constantly evolving self depends upon the full
use of its powers of inquiry-that is, speech-since the process of self-
realization would be stunted if the choices to be made were predetermined and
the information to be gathered as well as responded to were limited artificially
by law rather than by the self s own imperfect powers. 192 Each contraction of
190 See supra notes 178-81 and accompanying text.
191 See supra notes 102-18 and accompanying text.
192 See supra text accompanying notes 121-22.
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the circle of available speech to some degree reduces the potentiality of the self.
And while any nonabsolutist view of the First Amendment accepts that some
restrictions on speech and thus on the self must be allowed for other reasons, a
desire for social equality cannot justify undermining the object that is the
source of equality's worth.
The project of the self is an inquiry whose success turns on its access to
and use of speech to harmonize its understanding with reality and so chart its
future. This vision is plainly inconsistent with the notion that the ideas in some
speech actually blunt the self's inquiry, or that some speech should be excised
from the realm of possible speech merely because it convinces others to take
one's self less seriously. If there is anything at all to the concept of the self s
inquiry, it is that these challenged manifestations of speech, because they
represent the reality of other selves, are part of the reality of the world and
therefore are necessarily grist for the mill of the self.193 Any effect that so-
called hate speech has on an individual self is simply a part of the process of
that self s realization.
Reaction to offensive speech may take many forms, and the reaction of any
individual self is a function of that individual's autonomous will. Banishing
hate speech would injure both speakers and listeners. First, by forbidding them
the right to influence others through the assertion of their beliefs, it would deny
the self-realization of speakers who wish to engage in such speech. This is not
so distasteful a position as it may seem if one remembers that the value of self-
realization is to be found not in the nature of the self that results from the
process (however regrettable we may find that result) but in the ongoing
process itself, since the ultimate end of that process necessarily remains
unknown. But more to the point here, abolishing hate speech would also injure
its recipients by denying their ability to comprehend the full nature of the world
(again, unpleasant though this facet of it may be) and to adapt their views of the
world and their responses to it, in the form of their life plans, accordingly.
That is, when speakers are denied the right to express an idea, listeners are
prevented from hearing it, evaluating it for themselves, and reacting to it-
whether that reaction would take the form of embracing the idea, rejecting it,
or investigating it further. Restricting speech means denying listeners access to
ideas on the ground that those who hear them will not react properly; this is a
paternalism entirely inconsistent with the notion of the autonomous self.
193 See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
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2. Self-Realization Realization Through Censorship of Hate Speech
If self-realization occurs through speech, the counterpart to the above
argument might go, so do many harms inflicted upon the self. Social
equalitarians could agree that the self is the key value behind their drive for
social equality, but deny that there is a total identity between freedom of speech
and self-realization. A group of arguments that they have put forward indicates
that equalitarians would contend that speech as a component of the self must be
supplemented by a measure of legal security from the hurtful speech of others,
since such speech weakens the selves of its victims. These arguments, generally
known under the rubric of "silencing," actually comprise several different
notions. Robert Post has helpfully sorted them into three categories: "[V]ictim
groups are silenced because their perspectives are systematically excluded from
the dominant discourse; victim groups are silenced because the pervasive
stigma of racism systematically undermines and devalues their speech; and
victim groups are silenced because the visceral [reaction induced by] racist
speech systematically preempts response." 194
We can thus understand these types of arguments to include within their
compass not only harms done to individuals but also to groups by the
destruction of social structures that foster group identities. 195 The silencing
arguments posit that hate speech is different from other speech that might be
merely offensive; hate speech is not useful to the self, but rather it in some
sense disables the self, short circuiting the self-realization process. In essence,
these arguments seek to show that at least some of the rights that have been
identified herein as secondary to the speech right' 96 are in fact at least coequal
with it and therefore may be legitimately balanced against it.197 For instance,
rights against defamation, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress are clearly of the kind that serve to safeguard the integrity of
194 Post, Free Speech, supra note 13, at 306 (citations omitted). For the detailed
framing of these arguments, see MACKiNNON, supra note 3, at 77-78; CATHARiNE
MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 206 (1989); SUNsTEIN, supra
note 8, at 219-20; Richard Delgado, Canpus Anti-Racism Rules: Constitutional Narratives
in Collision, 85 Nw. U. L. REv. 343 (1991); Lawrence, IfHe Hollers, supra note 7, at 68-
69; Matsuda, supra note 31, at 24-26.
195 In addition to the sources cited in note 194 supra, see also Delgado, supra note 6,
at 93-96. These arguments are summarized and receive their fullest explication in Post,
Constitutional Concept, supra note 13.
196 See supra text at note 190; see also supra notes 178-81 and accompanying text.
197 See Post, Democratic Community, supra note 13, at 168-69 and sources cited
therein; see also PENNOCK, supra note 142, at 91 ("Collectivists hold that man needs society
to develop his full potentialities... and even to enable him to become fully autonomous.").
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the self. 198 But while the present argument would place such rights below the
right of free speech, limiting their applicability to instances in which the
speaker knowingly used false facts to injure someone, 199 social equalitarians
would presumably put rights against group defamation and the like on
something close to equal footing with the speech right, if not actually reverse
these rankings. 2°° In any case, the equalitarian analysis would clearly lead to
restricting hate speech on the ground that it harms the selves of its targets much
more than it contributes (if it does so at all) to the self-realization of its
speakers.
Social equalitarians might argue that if the justification for allowing hurtful
speech is, from the perspective of its victim, the opportunity to know the
complete reality of the world, then the justification is insufficient. No one
would pretend to believe that an individual's ability to grasp the nature of
reality is a perfect one. Indeed, Peirce's theory admits as much. 20 1 Moreover,
it is simply untenable to maintain that lack of "knowledge of the reality" of
hateful speech will dull the self's inquiry appreciably: the reality of racism and
sexism is far too apparent as it is. Restricting hate speech will remove from the
purview of its victims only that language with a capacity to degrade them that
infinitely exceeds its instructive qualities, such as they are. The impossibility of
attaining perfect knowledge of the world also counsels against recognizing any
significant self-realization rights of sponsors of hate speech. The self s freedom
to inquire of reality and chart its moral course thereby is so restricted by
human limitations that the state cannot be denied the power to prohibit extreme
speech that seriously inhibits its targets' selves from engaging in any self-
realizing inquiry at all.
In the end, the debate on this level boils down to one issue. On the one
hand, whether hate speech is to be protected because, as part of the realm of
possible expressions of beliefs and ideas, it must be available to speakers and
listeners engaged in the process of self-realization. Or, on the other hand,
whether such speech should be forbidden entry into public discourse based on
its capacities to harm those individuals and groups who are its subjects. To the
198 See TRIBE, supra note 178, §§ 15-16; Post, Denocradc Comnunity, supra note
13, at 168-69.
199 To be precise, the standard recommended here is that of "actual malice" adopted
by the Supreme Court in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-83 (1964)
(statements made with knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard of the truth).
Ronald Dworkin has suggested that this standard be adopted for all defamation suits. See
Dworkin, supra note 29, at 63.
200 See Delgado, supra note 6, at 97-100 (basing tort of racial insult on analogy with
defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress).
201 See supra text at note 109.
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degree that the theory of individual self-realization claims to provide not just
doubts about the equalitarians' rationales, but also a positive basis for rejecting
them, it must stand or fall based on the knowledge-gathering process as part of
self-realization, something that the equalitarian arguments dismiss as
outweighed by the injuries inflicted on the self by racist and sexist speech. At
the worst for the present argument, the debate portrayed thus far might be a
draw, called for lack of empirical evidence on either side.
Yet the theory of individual self-realization can enlist the aid of another
argument, the one that in fact has most often been made against hate speech
censorship, the argument from the principle of democratic self-rule. This
argument, for its part, has been seen as at least arguably vulnerable to the
equalitarian critique on other grounds; however, by drawing out the
relationship between democratic theory and the theory of self-realization-a
connection that has been too little noted and is in fact derivable from the larger
architectonic philosophy of Charles Peirce-it becomes clear that the two
principles in their natural combination foreclose the possibility that restrictions
on the ideas in speech could ever serve social equality.
B. The Response of Democratic Theory
In their own rejections of hate speech censorship, commentators
approaching the issue from the perspective of democratic theory have pointed
to the inconsistency of such action with basic principles of that theory as
embodied in the Constitution.202 Within classical democratic theory, free
speech is the corollary to equal voting rights. Democracy, based as it is on the
fundamental principle of self-rule, holds that people are bound to abide by the
decisions of the majority because they retain the right to try to change those
decisions through their speech. 203 The Constitution adopts a governing process
202 The self-realization rationale for seeing the speech right as preeminent among
fundamental rights, see supra notes 176-82 and accompanying text, has a well-recognized
counterpart in democratic theory, see, e.g., Post, Meiklejohn's Mistake, supra note 13, at
1123 ("The ideal of autonomy essentially distinguishes First Amendment jurisprudence from
other areas of constitutional law, which are most often associated with specific visions of
collective identity."); Anthony Lewis, The First Amendment, Under Fire from the Left, N.Y.
TIMES, March 13, 1994, at § 6, at 42 (quoting Justice Hugo Black's statement that "[f]irst in
the catalogue of human liberties essential to the life and growth of a government of, for and
by the people are those liberties written into the First Amendment to our Constitution").
203 See, e.g., Massey, supra note 8, at 116-22; Post, Between Democracy and
Community, supra note 13, at 170-71; Post, Free Speech, supra note 13, at 280-84; Post,
Meildejohn's Mistake, supra note 13, at 1123; Martin H. Redish & Gary Lippman,
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grounded in autonomy rather than heteronomy, the former defining itself as
one "in which the laws are made by the same people to whom they apply" and
the latter as one in which "the law-makers are different from those to whom the
laws are addressed." 2°4 Post explains that restricting speech to achieve social
equality implicitly suggests that the Equal Protection Clause may, by some
"Ultimate Interpreter," be placed outside the reach of the "collective will" of
the people by forbidding discussion that might question the provision's wisdom
or even the interpretation that some would give it.205 "Our government," Post
says plainly, "currently contains no such Interpreter, not even the Supreme
Court, whose constitutional decisions are always shadowed by the potential of
constitutional amendment or political reconstruction through subsequent
appointments." 206
By this account, democracy as taken up by the Constitution requires
freedom of speech within the realm of public discourse most often referred to
as the marketplace of ideas.207 Political equality, it is argued, trumps social
equality in the case of a conflict. The point is sharply drawn by Ronald
Dworkin:
The most fundamental egalitarian command of the Constitution is for equality
through the political process. We can imagine some compromises of political
equality that would plainly aid disadvantaged groups-it would undoubtedly
aid blacks and women, for example, if citizens who have repeatedly expressed
racist or sexist or bigoted views were denied the vote altogether. That would be
unconstitutional, of course .... 208
The notion that any idea that offended someone sufficiently could stand as an
adequate reason to expel that idea from public discourse "would leave first
amendment values in shambles." 209 And it is in the realm of public discourse
that First Amendment values are most closely allied with democratic processes,
since recognizing a veto of speech based on the offensive tastes it conveys
Freedom of Expression and the Gvic Republican Revival in Constitutional 7heory: The
Oninous Implications, 79 CAL. L. REv. 267, 273-81 (1991).
204 NoRBERTo BOBBIo, DEMOCRACY AND DIcTATORSHI 137 (Peter Kennealy trans.,
1989), quoted in Post, Free Speech, supra note 13, at 280; see also Massey, supra note 8,
at 117.
205 Post, Free Speech, supra note 13, at 293.
206 Id.; see also Post, Meiklejohn's Mistake, supra note 13, at 1116.
2 07 See Post, Free Speech, supra note 13, at 282-83 (citing support for this view in the
works of Benjamin Barber, John Dewey, Emile Durkheim, Claude Lefort, hiirgen
Habermas, John Rawls, and Frank Michelman).2 08 Dworkin, supra note 4, at 41.
209 TRIBE, supra note 178, § 15-18, at 1410.
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"would mean denying that some people-those whose tastes these are--have
any right to participate in forming the moral environment at all."210
To describe the effects of hate speech on its targets as "silencing" is to
misunderstand the nature of the self's reaction to speech.211 In the same way
that the democratic system allows for no figure of authority, independent of
what the people decide through public discussion, that is sanctioned to set
particular issues beyond debate, it similarly lacks any means of deciding that
some people are not speaking enough or that others are not taking adequate
notice of them.2 12 If the case for censoring speech turned on that speech's
tendency to persuade people to take one less seriously or to cause one to doubt
one's self or one's own beliefs, the inquiries and disagreements allowed
between individuals engaged in self-governance would surely be reduced to
only innocuous trivialities, since "[e]very powerful and controversial idea has a
potential negative impact on someone's self-esteem." 213
The attempt to distinguish racist and sexist speech from other types of
offensive speech can only be based on the strength of the emotions it creates in
its critics, something less than an objective barometer of what kinds of speech
must be suppressed. This seems an important consideration when one considers
that everyone-including both pro-choice and anti-abortion activists, white
supremacists, socialists, and any other group the imagination can conjure-
would doubtless have their own candidate for suppression. As Post suggests, in
such a situation, "the issue can be resolved only through the exercise of naked
210 Dworkin, supra note 4, at 41.
211 Henry Louis Gates, Jr. ridicules the notion of hate speech causing "silencing."
Responding to the silencing arguments and the remedy of allowing victims of hate speech to
"name[] the injury and identify its origins," he remarks:
This sounds, of course, like a popular primer on how psychotherapy is supposed to
work; with a few changes, the passage might be addressed to survivors of toxic
parenting. Indeed, "alexathymia"-the inability to name and articulate one's feelings-is
a faddish diagnosis in psychiatry these days. Nor is critical race theory's affinity with
the booming recovery industry a matter of chance. These days the recovery movement
is perhaps the principal source of resistance to the older and much-beleaguered
American tradition of individualism.
Henry L. Gates, Jr., Let Them Talk, NEw REPUBLIC, Sept. 20 & 27, 1993, at 37, 46
(reviewing MATSUDA ET AL., supra note 6).
212 See, e.g., Post, Free Speech, supra note 13, at 306-10 (arguing that it is
impossible to distinguish the results from alleged "silencing" from the results of what the
marketplace of ideas is supposed to do).
213 Dworkin, supra note 29, at 61; see also Post, Free Speech, supra note 13, at 307-
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group power, a solution not at all advantageous to the marginalized and
oppressed."214 Once this is understood, it becomes clear that to "solve" the
amorphous effects attributed to silencing through government enforced
censorship is merely to replace self-rule with an unrestrained majoritarianism,
one that makes the questionable assumption that the majority will always be on
the side of social equality.215 Perhaps all that need be said for this conclusion
in the face of dissatisfaction with the present system's apparent flaws is that
"[tjhe critical question is not how well truth will advance absolutely in
conditions of freedom but how well it will advance in conditions of freedom
compared with some alternative set of conditions." 216 In this sense, democracy,
through the speech right, endorses a particularly fundamental notion of
equality.217 Allowing censorship of particular ideas is to reject democracy. 218
The equalitarians' answer to this picture of classical democratic theory is to
suggest that however true it may be with regard to the lion's share of issues
that a democracy faces, social equality is an interest of an altogether higher
order than other issues. Setting the question of social equality beyond the
vicissitudes of the democratic decisionmaking process carried out through
2 14 Post, Free Speech, supra note 13, at 309; see also Massey, supra note 8, at 168.
215 See Redish & Lippman, supra note 203, at 279-80 (explaining how free speech as
a part of democracy provides the system with a Rawlsian "bet-hedging" check, since "[i]f
popular sovereignty is not required to legitimate political choices on a moral level, then any
political decision could be taken and legitimated solely by means of having the power to
enforce it").
216 Greenawalt, supra note 56, at 135; see also Redish & Lippman, supra note 203, at
278 ("The question the critics of classical democracy need to answer, however, is exactly
what the preferable alternative system is.").
217 The Supreme Court has likewise made this point:
To permit the continued building of our politics and culture, and to assure self-
fulfillment for each individual, our people are guaranteed the right to express any
thought free from government censorship....
There is an "equality of status in the field of ideas," and government must afford all
points of view an equal opportunity to be heard.
Police Department of the City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972) (quoting
ALEXANDER MEIKLjoIHN, POLmcAL FREEDOM: THE CONsTrrUTIONAL PowERs OF THE
PEOPLE 27 (1948)); see also HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 287-88
(Anders Wedberg trans., 2d ed. 1961); Karst, supra note 14, at 52-59.
218 See Redish & Lippman, supra note 203, at 276 ("Since a belief in societal self-
determination underlies our entire political system and constitutional structure,... we
cannot reject that belief without simultaneously rejecting the American form of
government."); see also Post, Free Speech, supra note 13, at 283-85.
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speech is not a circumvention of democracy, but rather a definition of it in light
of the Fourteenth Amendment, one that properly includes social equality as an
essential part of the process's baseline. 219 The marketplace of public discourse
is thus taken to be per se ineffective and illegitimate until social equality has
been achieved. Allegations of the silencing of minorities and women by racist
and sexist speech form a version of the argument, often made in other contexts
of the debate over speech and equality, that the marketplace of ideas has
experienced a market failure.220 Because the speech of these oppressed groups
is silenced, hate speech holds much more sway than would be the case in a
well-functioning arena of public discourse: the market is skewed and requires
governmental intervention in the form of penalties for hate speech for its
correction. 221
But the equalitarian argument goes further than mandating a one-time
correction of a "process defect" that would then allow re-opening the
marketplace of speech to all views on issues that might affect social equality.
Permitting the expression of any conceivably anti-equality ideas, even after
effecting a market correction, would breach the precondition of social equality
that is taken as necessary to the marketplace to begin with. 222 The argument, in
brief, is that democratic decisions on the overwhelmingly important question of
219 See, e.g., sources cited supra note 7.
220 See supra notes 194-95 and accompanying text. Charles Lawrence addresses the
marketplace notion in this context at some length. See Lawrence, IfHe Hollers, supra note
7, at 77-79. For general critiques of the concept of the "marketplace of ideas," see Baker,
supra note 35, at 974-79; Ingber, supra note 56; Lawrence B. Solum, Freedom of
Communicative Action: A Theory of First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 83 Nw. U. L.
REv. 54, 69-71 (1989); Jonathan Weinberg, Broadcasting and Speech, 81 CAL. L. REv.
1101, 1141-63 (1993).
221 Catharine MacKinnon sums up many of the strands in this argument:
It seems to me that the lack of access to speech by those with dissident views-views
not allowed to be expressed in the media, by a publishing world that excludes these, as
well as by systematic forms of exclusion like lousy educational systems that promote
illiteracy-are all forms of trouble for the First Amendment.
Lewis, supra note 202, at 42 (remarks of Catharine MacKinnon); see also Post,
Meildejohn's Mistake, supra note 13, at 1124-25 (summarizing the position of Sunstein and
other collectivists).
222 [IThe idea of the racial inferiority of non-whites infects, skews, and disables the
operation of the market (like a computer virus, sick cattle, or diseased wheat). It trumps
good ideas that contend with it in the market. It is an epidemic the marketplace of ideas
and renders it dysfunctional.
Lawrence, 1fHe Hollers, supra note 7, at 77.
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social equality must be suspended. If rejecting free speech means rejecting the
classical conception of democracy as it applies to this issue,223 so be it. The
Constitution, equalitarians contend, has already suspended democracy in this
sense, through the Equal Protection Clause, by "mandat[ing] the
disestablishment of the ideology of racism." 224 The Fourteenth Amendment is
said to provide the basis for limiting this encroachment on speech to a single
issue.
It is hard to know how to understand this argument other than as an
assertion that the Equal Protection Clause authorizes thought control. If the
Equal Protection Clause mandates the disestablishment of racist ideology, does
this mean that the Clause is insulated or immune somehow from attempts,
based on racist beliefs, to repeal the Fourteenth Amendment? And if so, are all
constitutional provisions likewise insulated on the ground that, whatever
purpose they serve, they similarly require the elimination of all speech
expressing beliefs set against their purposes? Or, if suspension of the First
Amendment is required only in the context of this one provision of the
Constitution, on what can such a limitation be based other than the political
beliefs of those proposing the suspension? Such a picture does not differ in any
principled way from a scenario in which anti-abortion forces first succeed in
passing a constitutional amendment to the effect that human life begins at
conception and then outlawing any speech that-perhaps by silencing and
deeply offending those who oppose abortion-might tend to undermine the
constitutional commitment to life.
The equalitarian argument is simply unresponsive to the point that all
governmental restraints on freedom-including those made in the name of
223 See supra notes 207-18 and accompanying text.
2 24 Lawrence, Introduction, supra note 7, at 15. The full sentence reads as follows:
"The [F]irst [A]mendment is employed to trump or nullify the only substantive meaning of
the [E]qual [P]rotection [C]lause, that the Constitution mandates the disestablishment of the
ideology of racism." Id. Catharine MacKinnon makes much the same point in advancing
her justification for regulating "racial harassment, pornography and hate propaganda":
At the very least, when equality is taken seriously in expressive settings, [hate speech
is] not constitutionally insulated from regulation on the ground that the ideas they
express cannot be regarded as false. Attempts to address them would not be
prohibited... on the ground that, in taking a position in favor of equality, such
attempts assume that the idea of human equality is true. The legal equality guarantee has
already decided that.
MACKNNON, supra note 3, at 106-07. "At the very least," in other words, the Equal
Protection Clause allows the State to restrict hate speech because the ideas it expresses are
false.
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equality-preserve their legitimacy only by remaining open to question through
free speech and subsequent changes through the political process. The Equal
Protection Clause contains nothing that could make it an exception to this
fundamental democratic principle. To the degree that equalitarian proposals
rely upon a logically illimitable rejection of fundamental tenets of democracy
(without legitimating such an action through amendment of the
Constitution 225), the argument from democracy for maintaining undiminished
speech rights in this context is unassailable, barring a wholesale abandonment
of democracy itself.
No doubt the persistence of proposals to censor hate speech and the
influence they continue to exercise226 is attributable to the powerful appeal of
the call for an end to racism and sexism. This appeal is especially notable given
that democratic theory's opposition to that call offers as an alternative what
might seem to be the comparatively bloodless ideal of government neutrality. If
democracy as a system of governance has no end beyond itself and no
substantive vision besides its commitment to self-rule, then it requires allowing
speech that most of us find anathema. This conclusion proves to be a
particularly bitter one in the context of issues as emotionally compelling as
racism and sexism. For some, it justifies a reconceptualization of democracy,
although the discussion above establishes that this conclusion can end only in a
denial of democracy.
Whether or not social equalitarians are seriously prepared to abandon the
democratic process to advance their goals, the repugnance of hate speech for all
of the participants in this debate, together with the imperfections of the
democratic process that are admitted by its most determined defenders,227
suggests the importance of identifying the nature of the moral force behind
democracy's defense of the freedom of speech against incursions in the name of
social equality. The preceding discussion makes clear that, as a descriptive
matter, the Constitution logically requires the political equality guaranteed by
free speech as part of the governing process. But in the interest of revealing the
error in the selective modification of democratic principles, it is also useful to
understand what would be lost were such attempts to succeed. That is, how can
225 In light of the argument that the Equal Protection Clause's command of social
equality also peremptorily forbids any effort to repeal it, it is reasonable to ask whether the
Constitution's provisions that allow for its own amendment similarly forbid efforts to repeal
them. It looks as if the paradox is, at least, a complete one.
2 26 Indeed, they have proved compelling enough to have had enormous influence
among the general population, universities, state legislatures, and other countries. See Post,
Free Speech, supra note 13, at 267-70; Nadine Strossen, A Feminist Critique of "The"
Feminist C'tique of Pornography, 79 VA. L. REV. 1099, 1114-27 (1993).
2 27 See supra note 216 and accompanying text.
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we say that the political equality demanded by democracy is, as a normative
matter, more valuable than the elimination of the undeniable pain caused by
hate speech? What does the protection of this speech contribute to our society
that outweighs that pain? There is an answer to these questions, and it exists as
a piece of the theory of the self enunciated in Part Ell above. If an integrated
and complete picture of the relationship between speech and both the individual
self and the self of the polity as created by democracy can explain definitively
why suppression of even hate speech injures rather than aids the self, then the
syllogistic conclusion of Part M above-that the desirability of social equality
cannot logically justify limitations on speech-will prove validated.
C. Democracy as Self-Realization
This Part, so far, has been concerned with defending the conclusion of
Parts I and III that social equality cannot be achieved through restrictions on
hate speech. The model of individual self-realization strongly suggests this
conclusion, yet it may nonetheless be vulnerable to equalitarian arguments, for
it depicts the value of speech as deriving from the self s inquiry into the nature
of reality, which because of the limitations of the individual can never be
complete. The argument from social equality maintains that the Fourteenth
Amendment properly constitutionalizes our nation's commitment to equality
based on communal knowledge painfully acquired over decades of racial strife
and thus removes decisions on such matters, even as manifested in speech,
from the control of the imperfect individual. In answer to this, democratic
theory provides what is often portrayed as a discrete basis for denying such an
interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause. By forbidding restrictions on the
expression of ideas, the rule of this model takes open public discourse to be
essential to the power of the government over its citizens. Yet equalitarians
contend that our understanding of what democracy requires should be emended
if it can provide no convincing instrumental justification for tolerating the evils
of oppression of subordinated groups.
There is, however, a way of understanding democracy's insistence on self-
rule as a dedication to something more than undirected majoritarian choice in
which the minority's contribution to the process is ended once the choice is
made. Further, this understanding of the theory behind democracy
demonstrates a mutually supporting basis between it and the model of
individual self-realization. Correctly understood, the two theories are knit
together in a way that establishes the ultimate failure of the argument for
censoring speech as a means of attaining social equality.
The argument outlined in the preceding section explains that democracy
reserves the power of government-including the right to speak in favor of
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unpopular positions-to all citizens based on the centrality of the autonomous
individual to our system of personal rights, 228 a principle presumably not in
doubt even among social equalitarians. Thus all would agree that an action of
the government is valid only insofar as all competent citizens had the right to
participate (whether directly or indirectly) in the decision to take the action.
That right of participation, we should also be able to agree, extends not only to
voting but also to speech on the question to be decided. The argument for
restricting hate speech departs from classical democratic theory in its view of
the role of speech upon an issue already decided by this participatory system.
For equalitarians, once the decision has been made, the value of speech
protesting that decision and urging its reversal is enormously vitiated, if not
exhausted altogether. The enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment, on this
view, closes the question of the propriety of social equality. 229 Democratic
theory, however, does not envision our system as one in which issues are
serially laid to rest for perpetuity by means of a single vote, even one that takes
place after a full airing of all views. Rather, it contemplates self-government as
an ongoing process in which the democratic community lives as an organic
entity capable of reconstituting itself over time.23 0
Therein lies the vital connection between individual self-realization and
democracy, a connection that Peirce's thought can illuminate. Part II above
explained that speech supplies the key to individual self-realization by allowing
the individual self to explore the nature of the external world, continually
modifying its beliefs through an internal dialogue with itself as that exploration
continues, and, based upon its beliefs at any given moment, to assert itself
through choosing its life plan. But this process is not confined to the internal
evolution of the individual self: it is replicated among the selves that form a
community. As Peirce put it:
[M]an's circle of society... is a sort of loosely compacted person, in some
respects of higher rank than the person of an individual organism. It is [this
fact, combined with the evolving conversation that is the individual] that
228 See Post, Free Speech, supra note 13, at 285; Redish & Lippman, supra note 203,
at 274.
229 See supra note 224 and accompanying text.
230 See Redish & Lippman, supra note 203 at 276-77 ("Numerous well-established
philosophical arguments that justify our democratic system reflect the societal commitment
to self-determination."); see also Post, Meiklejohn's Mistake, supra note 13, at 1128
("Public discourse merits unique constitutional protection because it is the process through
which the democratic 'self,' the agent of self-government, is itself constituted through the
reconciliation of individual and collective autonomy.").
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render[s] it possible for you-but only in an abstract, and in a Pickwickian
sense-to distinguish between absolute truth and what you do not doubt.231
The communal inquiry aimed at comprehending external reality is simply the
aggregation of the inquiries conducted by the individual members of the
community. Like the individual, the society seeks to stabilize its beliefs as a
means to knowing the world and so determining how best to live in that
world.23 2
For the community, as for the individual, the realization of its self depends
upon this process and requires that it not be closed off or predetermined by
external authority. What Peirce said about the individual's path to realization
through speech applies with equal force to the self of the polity: "Were the
ends of a person already explicit [and antecedently fixed], there would be no
room for development, for growth, for life; and consequently there would be
no personality." 23 3 The self that exists by virtue of the speech capacity and
evolves through the use of that capacity is the self capable of moral autonomy;
it is governed not by animal instinct but rather by the power to know the world
as an animal cannot and to make choices based upon that knowledge. While
individual selves each possess their own autonomous wills, they are bound
together in the same world and conduct their inquiries amongst each other so as
to create a community of understanding. 23 4
Thus, democracy as societal self-realization is bottomed on the belief that
the self of the polity fulfills its potential through the exercise of its collective
free will, a process that is distinguished from and superior to authoritarianism
because it insists on the ability of the community to use its reason, borne of
speech, as a means of learning and so achieving agreement. The
authoritarianism that the social equalitarian program implicitly endorses
necessarily denies the significance of inquiry and reason for the process of
decisionmaking: it allows a majority, not only to restrict the freedom of all for
no better reason than to do so is the majority's will, but also to forbid contrary
231 Peirce, supra note 115, at 91; see also supra note 118 and accompanying text.
232 See supra notes 102-18 and accompanying text.
233 6 PEIRcE, supra note 75, 157, quoted in COLAPiETRO, supra note 17, at 77
(editorial insertion in COLAPIETRO). Redish and Lippman make a similar point:
The "freedom" of society to select only the moral choices some external source
has already made.., is no freedom at all; it would be a "democratic" system only in
the same hollow and Orwellian sense that any totalitarian government holds "elections"
with only the government's candidates running can be considered democratic.
Redish & Lippman, supra note 203, at 279.
234 See supra notes 113-18 and accompanying text.
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speech in the belief that to allow debate would endanger the security of the
majority's decision. But speech can be regarded as a threat instead of an aid to
decisionmaking only if one repudiates the error-correcting value of speech on
the ground that one's beliefs and decisions are infallible.
In contrast, democracy embraces the notion of epistemological humility, a
principle that commits us to searching for agreement based on knowledge while
demanding vigilance against the arrogant belief that we have ever found
ultimate truth and therefore can afford to abandon the search. As Peirce put it:
Who would have said, a few years ago, that we could ever know of what
substances stars are made whose light may have been longer in reaching us
than the human race has existed? Who can be sure of what we shall not know
in a few hundred years? Who can guess what would be the result of continuing
the pursuit of science for ten thousand years, with the activity of the last
hundred?235
But while Peirce maintained that "it is unphilosophical to suppose that, with
regard to any given question (which has any clear meaning), investigation
would not bring forth a solution of it, if it were carried far enough,"236 he also
insisted that "I will not... admit that we know anything whatever with
absolute certainty."23 7 In other words, knowledge is attainable, but we can
never be so sure that we have attained it that we can afford to stop investigating
our doubts.
It was seen above that because no single person can expect to reconcile her
beliefs perfectly to the reality of the external world, the theory of individual
self-realization arguably remained susceptible to the equalitarian argument for
restricting speech as a means of protecting the self. Yet although the individual
self's process of realization can never achieve its ideal, it does progress towards
the ideal as it acquires measures of knowledge through adapting its beliefs as it
experiences the reality of the world.238 Further, individual efforts to grasp truth
do not benefit individuals alone, for the fruits of these efforts come together in
a communal inquiry. This is the vision to which democracy is committed: A
235 Charles S. Peirce, How To Make Our Ideas Gear, POPULAR ScIENCE MONTHLY,
Jan. 1878, at293, reprinted in THE ESSENIAL PEiRCE, supra note 1, at 124, 140.236 Id. (emphasis added).
237 7 PEIRCE, supra note 75, 108; see also Martin H. Redish, Product Health Claims
and the First Amenment Scientific Expression and the Twilight Zone of Comercial
Speech, 43 VAlN. L. REv. 1433, 1443-44 (1990) (giving numerous examples of mistaken
belief in certainty of scientific belief); Redish & Lippman, supra note 203, at 281-82
(illustrating the links among respect for self-determination, epistemological humility with
regard to speech, and the democratic process).
238 See supra notes 102-12 and accompanying text.
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community of persons, acting individually and together simultaneously,
constantly developing and refining its conception of the good life-i.e.,
governing itself-based upon the continuous search for knowledge. The process
of inquiry carried out through speech leads to the realization of our individual
and communal selves by bringing us closer to complete knowledge of the world
and thus increasing our grounds for agreement about how we should live. Yet
because we can never know when we have achieved such knowledge, we
cannot decide that the truth about any particular issue has been so clearly
established as to eliminate the need to consider the views of those who disagree
or who might disagree in the future.23 9
What remains of this Part will be devoted to a close reading of a key text
in First Amendment jurisprudence as a way of examining these propositions
about the epistemology of democracy. If, as has been suggested, they reflect
the basis of our constitutional democracy, then the reading of the Equal
Protection Clause propounded by social equalitarians cannot be correct.
Moreover, if these propositions command assent on their own intellectual
merits, then any attempt to legitimate such a reading by amending either our
understanding of the Constitution or the Constitution's text itself, is at best a
misguided effort and at worst a grave danger to the future of the human self.
Equalitarians, in criticizing the justification of free speech supported by
democratic theory, have pointed to what even they usually admit is one of the
most powerful statements of the First Amendment's purpose to be found in the
239 Even Stanley Fish allows that such a conception is at least an honest possible
alternative to his vision of First Amendment defenders as secret promoters of a hidden
political agendum:
My mistake, one could argue, is to equate the something in whose service speech is
with some locally espoused value (e.g., the end of racism, the empowerment of
disadvantaged minorities), whereas in fact we should think of that something as a now-
inchoate shape that will be given firm lines only by time's pencil.
FISH, supra note 57, at 109. Yet he simply cannot bring himself to believe in the value of
tolerating painful speech "for the sake of a future whose emergence we can only take on
faith." Id. To Fish, "[it is by no means clear that history's trajectory is benign." Fish,
supra note 57, at 1077. With little more than this cursory consideration of the self-
realization value of speech, Fish chooses to regard it as more likely being a "strateg[y]
designed to delegitimize the complaints of victimized groups." FIsH, supra note 57, at 110.
Pierce Schlag provides a witty analysis of Fish's true project in an article that
simultaneously celebrates and debunks that project. See Pierre Schlag, How To Do Tings
wfth the First Amendment, 64 U. COLO. L. REv. 1095 (1993).
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United States Reports.2 40 In dissenting from the Supreme Court's decision in
Abrams v. United States,241 Justice Holmes acknowledged the temptation to
censor speech likely to lead to consequences one abhors. "But," he continued,
when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may
come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own
conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-
that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their
wishes safely can be carried out. That at any rate is the theory of our
Constitution. It is an experiment, as all life is an experiment. Every year if not
every day we have to wager our salvation upon some prophecy based upon
imperfect knowledge.242
Cass Sunstein, for instance, has characterized Holmes's figure of the
marketplace of ideas as expounding the unseemly ideology of "modem interest-
group pluralism... [in which] politics consists of the outcomes of struggles
for power among self-interested groups." 243 He contrasts this view with
another opinion, briefly considered above in Part H1,2 44 Justice Brandeis's
concurrence in Whitney v. California.245 In Whitney, Brandeis asserted that
"[those who won our independence believed that the final end of the State was
to make men free to develop their faculties .... "246 Sunstein says that, "[i]n
place of Holmes' hard-headed skepticism, Brandeis offers an exceedingly
optimistic, even romantic account of the contribution of political deliberation to
both democratic government and the development of human faculties." 247 He
further suggests that although the differences between the two Justices'
perspectives were irrelevant in Whitney and Abrams, cases concerning
government suppression of political dissent, Brandeis would have understood
the failings of the marketplace model in the context of social inequality, while
Holmes would not.248
Sunstein's critique of the marketplace of ideas plays upon a version of that
concept in which the marketplace for speech has no instrumental justification
240 See, e.g., MACKINNON, supra note 3, at 71 & n.1; SuNSTEIN, supra note 8, at 24-
28.
241 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
242 Id. at 630 (Holmes, J., joined by Brandeis, J., dissenting).
243 SuNsTEiN, supra note 8, at 27.
244 See supra text at note 37.
245 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
2 46 Id. at 372 (Brandeis, J., joined by Holmes, J., concurring).
2 47 SuNsTEiN, supra note 8, at 27.
2 48 Id. at 28.
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independent of serving as a mechanism for implementing the decisions of the
majority. When interpreted this way, Holmes's invocation of the marketplace
as a way of finding truth defines truth not as objective reality, but rather only
as "political truth," i.e., whatever the more politically powerful segment of the
polity decides is "true." 249 If this is indeed what Holmes meant-or if this is
the way we choose to understand him-then the problem, as Sunstein sees it, is
that free speech might be perverted to serve the powerful in enforcing unethical
ends. For if unrestricted public discourse is nothing more than a means to
facilitate the brutish will of the majority, and, further, if one posits an infallible
(external) authority instructing us that opposition to social equality is
normatively and empirically wrong, then it seems clear that social equality
should be incorporated into the premises of democratic theory.25 0 Barring the
fulfillment of those preconditions, however, Sunstein cannot meet his burden.
Holmes's Abrams dissent is the appropriate text for evaluating democracy's
response to the equalitarians. But its real import is not as Sunstein and others
have characterized it. The most useful meaning of Holmes's statement that the
marketplace produces truth is that open public discourse will in fact lead to the
discovery of objective reality. So understood, the notion of the marketplace of
ideas supplies democratic theory with a foundation that goes beyond exalting
the popular will wherever it may lead: with the promise of the discovery of
truth, self-rule means that the polity's choices about how to direct its future will
be based upon a continuing investigation aimed at producing knowledge of all
of the facts relevant to its decisions. Moreover, reading Holmes's opinion in
this way makes it possible to see the interdependence of democracy and
individual self-realization. These conclusions are supported by the fact that
Charles Peirce's system of philosophy underlies not only the speech-based
theory of individual self-realization, but also Justice Holmes's conception of the
function of speech within a democracy.
The seemingly obligatory footnote to Holmes's discussion of the
marketplace of ideas explains the debt that Holmes's thinking owes to the
2 49 See SUNSThIN, supra note 8, at 27; see also Frederick Schauer, Free Speech and
the Argwnent from Democracy, 25 [LIBERAL DEMOCRACY] NoMos 241, 247 (J. Roland
Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1983) (stating that Holmes's dissent in Abrams adopts
the view that "political truths are, by definition, those made so by the majority").
Although his ultimate conclusion is that Holmes did not believe in objective truth,
Sunstein does recognize the ambiguity in Holmes's discussion of truth. See SUNsTnN, supra
note 8, at 25-26 (acknowledging the influence of Charles Peirce on Holmes's opinion); see
also Greenawalt, supra note 56, at 153; Solum, supra note 220, at 68-72.
250 See Greenawalt, supra note 56, at 154 ("Unless an independent notion of truth is
supposed, an argument that truth is what emerges from the marketplace of ideas does not
yield distinctive support for a free speech principle."); see also SCHAUER, supra note 56, at
19-20; Solum, supra note 220, at 71.
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second chapter of John Stuart Mill's On Liberty. 251 However, noting the fact
that Holmes and Peirce came out of a common intellectual milieu and even
belonged to the same philosophical discussion group in the 1870s,252 scholars
have identified Peirce's work as a more immediate and important source for the
Abrams opinion. 253 Indeed, Louis Menand has recently called Holmes's free
speech opinions "the greatest single contribution to American life" made by
Peirce's thought.25 4 Referring specifically to Holmes's language in Abrams,
Menand remarks that "even the metaphors are Peircean." 255 Peirce's
epistemology can thus illuminate Holmes's use of the marketplace trope.
In discussions of the marketplace concept, it has been objected that there is
little reason to believe that objective truth exists, or if it does, that people are
capable of recognizing it.256 And even when the legal literature has considered
251 JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (1849), reprinted in THE UTILrrARIANS 473, 490-
530 (1973).
252 The young Holmes was, along with Peirce, a member of a fortnightly
"metaphysical club," which met in Cambridge in the 1870s. See Paul Weiss, Biography of
Charles S. Peirce, 14 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 398 (Dumas Malone ed.,
1934), reprinted in PERSPECTIVES ON PEIRCE, supra note 98, at 1, 6.
253 Some have minimized or denied entirely Peirce's influence on Holmes. See, e.g.,
SHELDON NovicK, HONORABLE JUSTICE: THE LIFE OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES 426-27
n.4 (1989); H.L. POHLMAN, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES & UTILrrAIAN
JURISPRUDENCE 163-64 (1984). Nonetheless, the considered view of the most persuasive
authorities has been that, despite some unreliable evidence on the other side of the question,
Holmes's understanding of the relationship between speech and truth owed much to Peirce's
way of thinking. See, e.g., Max H. Fisch, Charles Sanders Peirce (1939), reprinted in MAX
FISCH, PEIRCE, SEMIOTIC, AND PRAGMATISM: ESSAYS BY MAX FISCH 17 n.27 (Kenneth L.
Ketner & Christian J.W. Kloesel eds., 1986) (stating that "Holmes's general outlook was
closer to Peirce's than to [William] James's, and many phrases, including his fonudas for
truth, read like echoes of Peirce's conversation") (emphasis added); Catharine W. Hantzis,
Legal Innovation Within the Wider Intellectual Tradition: The Pragniatin of Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr., 82 Nw. U. L. REv. 541, 545-47 (1988) (reviewing the evidence on the matter
and concluding that "the relevant tradition [for placing Holmes's philosophy] is the
pragmatism of Peirce and [William] James"); Richard A. Posner, 7he Jurisprudence of
Skepticism, 86 MICH. L. REv. 827, 879 n.90 ("Parts of the Abrwns dissent seem almost a
paraphrase of Peirce's essay The Fixation of Belief ... Holmes [and] Peirce... have
much in common.").
254 Louis Menand, An American Prodigy, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Dec. 2, 1993, at 30,
35 (reviewing JOSEPH BRENT, CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE: A LuFE (1993)).
255 Id.
256 See Baker, supra note 35, at 974; Ingber, supra note 56, at 25-26. But see
Greenawalt, supra note 56, at 132-34; Barry Holden, Liberal Democracy and the Social
Detemination ofIdeas, 25 [LIBERAL DEMOCRACY] NOMOS, supra note 249, at 289, 294-97
(arguing that the notion that "ideas are socially determined and that they are relative-and
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Peirce's views, it has often been asserted that Peirce himself believed that truth
was nothing more than what a given community decided to believe.257 These
assertions misstate, however, what is admittedly a difficult aspect of his
thought. Peirce did suggest that we could understand truth as the conclusion
reached by the community; but, this is the case only when the community is
given its most expansive definition and only when the inquiry is posited as
having continued for an infinite period of time:
The real, then, is that which, sooner or later, information and reasoning would
finally result in, and which is therefore independent of the vagaries of me and
you. Thus, the very origin of the conception of reality shows that this
conception essentially involves the notion of a COMMUNITY, without
definite limits, and capable of an indefinite increase of knowledge.25 8
The community does not "create" truth, but it is able, through the combined
and infinitely ongoing efforts of the individuals within it, to discover truth. As
Christopher Hookway has expressed it: "[l]f we were to inquire efficiently
enough, and for long enough, then we are guaranteed, eventually, to arrive at
the truth." 259 While we, as individuals and a society existing in time, will
obviously have to make decisions about how to live in the world and so will
have to act on our beliefs, our beliefs must always remain open to revision.
Peirce's explanation of the acquisition of knowledge refutes rather than
vindicates communitarian notions suggesting that "each group of language
users, each cultural formation or discursive universe, constructs a 'reality' that
is, in practical consequences, real enough." 260 Although his thinking has often
been co-opted in support of such beliefs, "Peirce would not have had the
smallest degree of patience with such a theory. For him the community is
do not express truths" should be "rejected as incoherent"); William P. Marshall, A
Reconstruction of the Search for Truth (January 1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
the author) (proposing numerous bases for grounding First Amendment freedoms of speech
and religion on the quest for transcendent truth).
This, it should be noted, is not the position of the equalitarians who assert, at the very
least, the objective truth of the importance of social equality.
2,57 See, e.g., Solum, supra note 220, at 71. Even many of those who affirm Holmes's
affinity with Peirce endorse some version of this idea. See, e.g., Thomas C. Grey, Holmes
and Legal Pragmatism, 41 STAN. L. REv. 787, 789, 800 (1989); Hantzis, supra note 253,
at 552, 555-57; Posner, supra note 253, at 879-80.
258 Peirce, supra note 1, at 52 (emphasis added).
259 HOOKWAY, supra note 74, at 73; see also MISAK, supra note 104, at 126-37;
SKAGESTAD, supra note 102, at 25-26, 76-79.
260 Menand, supra note 254, at 34. Thomas Grey goes particularly far in this
direction. See Grey, supra note 257, at 800.
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always identical with the species, and the last analysis really is the last."261 A
full explanation of Peirce's notion of the truth is impossible here, and its
complexity has only been hinted at. The important idea is that Peirce believed
that the achievement of total knowledge of reality was a goal that could be
approached asymptotically by a community of inquirers. 262 While perfect
knowledge must always be regarded as a point lying on the horizon of a future
time, the progress toward that point means an increase in knowledge.263 The
ability of inquiry to propel us toward the point on the horizon demonstrates the
value of inquiry; our inability actually to reach the point in a finite period of
time mandates that the inquiry continue, never foreclosing the reconsideration
of any belief, even those which we hold most strongly. Hence, Peirce's
epistemology avoids the pitfalls of both skepticism and dogmatism. 264 If total
knowledge of the world has potential to become a reality-one that is
achievable only over the long run-contingent decisions about what may and
may not be discussed become essentially intolerable, hence Peirce's belief that
the greatest intellectual mistake was to "block the way of inquiry." 265
The connections between this account of Peirce's view of reality and
Holmes's dissent in Abrams make clear what Menand meant in remarking that
Holmes's metaphors were Peircean. Holmes, after all, did not say that the
marketplace of ideas would discover "political truth." He said it was the best
chance for discovering truth. It hardly sounds like what Sunstein calls "hard-
headed skepticism" to believe that freedom of speech is "an experiment as all
life is an experiment" in which "we have to wager our salvation upon some
prophecy based upon imperfect knowledge." These are indeed the metaphors of
Peirce's dedication to the scientific method of attaining knowledge and his faith
that inquiry could lead the community to an end that no individual could expect
261 Menand, supra note 254, at 34; see also MIsAK, supra note 104, at 81. Much of
the confusion over this matter has probably arisen due to the tendency to group Peirce, not
only with other thinkers of his own time whose versions of pragmatism Peirce found
objectionable, but also with modem pragmatists and neopragmatists who differ profoundly
from him on this question. For a comprehensive account of Peirce's ultimate belief in
objective truth and its superiority over the neopragmatists skepticism, see CARL R.
HAUSMAN, CHARLEs S. PEmcE's EvoLuTIoNARY PHI.OoPHY 194-225 (1993).
262 See HAUSMAN, supra note 261, at 217-21; SKAGETAD, supra note 102, at 75-78.
263 See MISAK, supra note 104, at 79-85 (explaining Peirce's endorsement of the
scientific method as the model for inquiry).
264 See SKAGESTAD, supra note 102, at 25-26; see also HOOKWAY, supra note 74, at
265 1 PEmCE, supra note 75, 135.
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to see. As Holmes also said, "[tihat at any rate is the theory of our
Constitution." 266
Peirce's concept of truth thus provides democratic theory with a rationale
that goes beyond a version of societal autonomy that endorses any decision,
however ill advised, made by the majority. For if public discourse offers the
means to the discovery of truth, then democracy is best seen as the exercise of
a communal autonomy with the crucial difference that it is guided by a quest
for an understanding of reality. Social equalitarians would thus have no basis
upon which to propose suspending or modifying democratic principles to
outlaw disfavored speech in the name of a particular substantive goal. To argue
that a goal such as social equality trumps the democratic process, it would be
necessary to argue either that supporters of such measures have knowledge to
which the polity is not privy or that they possess powers of normative
judgment that exceed those of the society at large. Neither of these arguments
is available once we accept that democracy is best understood-and that the
Constitution does in fact understand it-as a project of choosing our societal
fate through the exercise of communal will based on our best chance of
discovering truth.
As for the problem of the failure of the marketplace, this schema of its
processes recognizes the possibility, even the inevitability, of all kinds of
human error. But there is nothing distinctive about those errors supposedly
attributable to "marketplace failure." Because we can never be certain enough
of the truth of any proposition to foreclose the chance of learning something
that might change our minds, none of the errors coming out of public discourse
(even assuming we could identify them as such) are correctable by external fiat.
Hence the necessity of the ongoing inquiry.267 The errors resulting from so-
called market failure will take time to be corrected, as do all errors. The
economic and social shortcomings of society may have effects that hamper the
process of inquiry (although they will almost certainly also supply a powerful
impetus to speech urging their own correction 268). But because the accretion of
knowledge is a continuing process, although it encounters obstacles and takes
266 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, at 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., joined by
Brandeis, J., dissenting).
267 It is even misleading to speak of "market failures" in the marketplace of ideas.
Since we do not have a theory of what a well-functioning first amendment "market"
would look like, it gives false comfort to suggest that the problem is ascertainable
"failures" that need only be eliminated in order to generate good outcomes.
David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 91 COLuM. L. REv.
334, 349 (1991).
268 See Redish & Lippman, supra note 203, at 277.
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missteps along the way, allowing it to continue is the best chance for the
correction of the errors.
Peirce's thought does more than validate the legitimacy of free speech as a
mere instrument of democratic theory. The societal search for the good life
depends upon the aggregation of that process as it is carried out by individuals.
The communal search for knowledge requires the testing of disagreements
among people and envisions the competition as healthy for individuals and the
society alike.26 9 The process necessarily begins with the creation of the
individual self through the triadic behavior of speech and entails the self s life-
long realization through inquiry into the nature of reality. And while perfect
understanding of reality is clearly beyond the reach of any individual,270 to be
allowed to make one's way towards it means a more perfect realization.271 The
principle of individual self-realization thus harmonizes completely with the
marketplace of ideas as a medium for the achievement of objective truth. Free
speech is not dictated by the choice of democracy; instead, democracy is
required once the full value and purpose of speech is understood. Realization of
the individual selves within the community joins with the community's own
realization as the free exchange of speech fuels both processes.
V. CONCLUSION
The persistence of racism and sexism in our nation more than a century
after the adoption of the Civil War Amendments is an unhappy reality of
American life. Despite the undeniable progress that has been made in the last
thirty years, the intransigence of the problem has proved so frustrating that
substantial numbers of people, both within and outside of the legal community,
stand ready to visit radical changes upon firmly established principles of free
speech and democracy. The failure of more conventional efforts to eradicate all
of the manifestations of discrimination has led many to the conclusion that
control over the expression of ideas contrary to social equality is the only
remaining route to progress. Thus, they have cast their lot on the side of
equality, trusting that any measure aiding the fight against oppression could not
cost more than it will repay.
The passion for social equality is admirably motivated, but it must not be
allowed to blind us to the dangers posed by its overzealous pursuit. To those
who claim to prize the worth of the individual, no good can come from fighting
prejudice by preventing people from speaking-or, only slightly more
269 See, e.g., Massey, supra note 8, at 165; Redish & Lippman, supra note 203, at
274-75.
2 70 See supra text at notes 109, 200.
271 See supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text.
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ominously, from thinking-thoughts deemed wrong or immoral. What is
special about human beings is that they do think and that through speech they
share their thoughts with others in the quest to fulfill their potential, both as
individuals and as a community. The intellectual fallibility that is also a part of
being human militates not for the expulsion of ideas adjudged evil by
government, but rather for an understanding that ideas-and speech, the
medium of ideas-occupy a realm importantly distinct from other aspects of
life. And while actions induced by ideas are and must be subject to society's
legal control, it is the capacity to conceive ideas at all and the freedom to
indulge that capacity that endow humans with the characteristics that make
society itself possible.
If speech about questions upon which the majority has already made a
decision is considered worthless (and even criminal where speech decrying the
majority's decision causes pain to some), then the freedom of speech could fall
gradually into desuetude as society secures itself against dissent on issue after
issue until the community has completely crystallized its legally speakable
beliefs, locking itself onto a single course. Such a scenario is only the logical
extreme implied by proposals to ban speech in opposition to social equality.
This image of an ideologically static society is chilling because it embodies the
antithesis of what democracy most fundamentally imagines human life to be
about. The temptation to prevent others from falling into what we feel sure to
be erroneous beliefs is powerful indeed, particularly when the very expression
of those beliefs pains us by challenging our own sense of who we are.
Forbidding our ideological enemies from exercising their most human powers
may appear both to resolve clashes over values and to save ourselves the pain
of conflict; in reality, however, doing so only diminishes us all. We cannot
increase our humanity, however desperate our desire to do so, by chipping
away at its foundation.
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